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The Treaty of Rome establishing the European 
Common Market went into force on January 1, 1958. At the 
time there was considerable skepticism in some quarters 
that a restructuring of national economic relationships as 
far-reaching as that projected in the Treaty would reach 
fruition. It was known that numerous uncertainties lay 
ahead in the compromising of conflicting points of view of 
the various interests affected at every stage of the trans­
ition period. There was ample precedent for believing that 
such an ambitious experiment in economic integration would 
fail.
Now that the Common Market is more than seven years 
old, the doubts concerning its permanency have begun to re­
cede, although it is realized that there may still be pit­
falls on the road to final realization of the plan. Notwith­
standing that serious disagreements have occurred in the 
continuing negotiations, it is a fact that much progress
1
already has been made toward the goal of fusing the six mem­
ber economies. At mid-1965 tariff reductions and other 
changes leading to economic integration were approximately 
three years ahead of the original timetable. Tariffs be­
tween the six members have been reduced to less than fifty 
per cent of their levels in 1957. Recent proposals by the 
European Economic Community Commission called for abolish­
ing all duties by July 1, 1967, and final alignment of nat­
ional tariffs on the common external tariff by that time.
The adoption of these proposals, however, must now await re­
solution of additional fundamental disagreements which re­
cently have occurred.
From the outset one of the concerns of those who 
questioned the workability of the Common Market plan was 
the possibility that it might prove to be an unbalanced, 
hence an unstable, arrangement due to excessive differences 
in size of the separate economies. It was thought that an­
other stumbling block might be the disparities in levels of 
development of the national economies comprising the Common 
Market. In particular, it was argued by some that the eco­
nomy of West Germany, because of its larger and more heavily 
capitalized industrial base, its aggressive business lead­
ership and other advantages, would benefit from the arrange-
ment more than its partners. There were those who reasoned 
further that these advantages could even work to the detri­
ment of one or more other members which might be overwhelmed 
by German economic power unless more safeguards were added. 
Probably the most forthright presentation of this view has 
been made by the English economist, E, Strauss. The present 
study undertakes to investigate this hypothesis insofar as 
conclusions may be drawn from the first six years of the Com­
mon Market's operation. Though the separate economies of the 
bloc are not yet fully integrated, quantitative trade restric­
tions largely have been removed and movements of capital and 
labor increasingly freed along with the previously mentioned
tariff reductions.
Anyone familiar with recent literature on the Common
Market will have noted that several writers have either trac­
ed its development to earlier and more limited attempts at 
unification or have drawn analogies between this latest effort 
at economic integration and others which have been made in 
the past. In this connection, the German Zollverein of the 
nineteenth century has often been mentioned as a precedent, 
and comparisons have been made between it and the Common 
Market. Possibly the most provocative treatment to be found 
is that in E. Strauss' book. Common Sense about the Common 
Market, published in 1958.
In Chapter II, we have briefly sketched the develop­
ment of the Zollverein, using material from several basic 
histories, and then attempted to evaluate Mr, Strauss’ views. 
Chapter III reviews the more contemporary events leading up 
to the Treaty of Rome, again using Mr, Strauss’ book as a 
springboard for a discussion in which an attempt is made to 
show that the creation of the Common Market was not German- 
inspired.
Chapters IV, V and VI are basically empirical in char­
acter, Chapter IV gives the balance of payments histories 
of the six Common Market nations and Greece, which is now an 
associate member.
Chapter V presents a brief review of recent customs 
union theory, especially that part which has a bearing on 
this study. It also includes a description and analysis of 
data relevant to the economic growth and the foreign trade 
of the member nations.
Chapter VI contains data on labor and capital move­
ments, The data for the entire study were derived from pub­
lications of official international organizations.
Chapter VII summarizes the findings and offers con­
clusions as to whether the hypothesis concerning German dom­
ination of the Common Market is justified.
CHAPTER II
THE ZOLLVEREIN AND THE COMMON MAWCET
"The German Empire has been built," wrote Keynes,
"more truly on coal and iron than on blood and iron."^ Like
most other epigrammatic summaries of a complex historical
and economic process, this one scarcely begins to explain
the foundation of German industrial growth. And, as Norman
2Pounds shows in his essay, "Economic Growth in Germany," 
Keynes' statement, by its misplaced emphasis, may give the 
impression that only because and until Germany began to ex­
ploit reserves of her basic raw materials did she make any 
industrial progress. Actually, Pounds says, Germany had a 
considerable amount of manufacturing industry before it was 
known that she possessed much in the way of natural resource 
endowment. Veblen once even wrote that, "As is well known.
^Jc M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), p. 81.
^Hugh G. J. Aitken (ed.), The State and Economic 
Growth (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1959), 
p. 190. Papers of a conference held Oct. 11-13, 1956, under 
the auspices of the Committee on Economic Growth.
the Fatherland is not at all specially fortunate in natural
resources of the class that count toward modern industry."^
Rostow places Germany's tentative date for the take-off into
2economic growth at between 1850 amd 1873, or from two to 
three decades before her pig iron production even began to
3approach the volume of British production.
Economic historians frequently cite the organization 
of the Zollverein as a major factor promoting rapid economic
4development in Germany after a belated start. To understand 
the importance of this institution to Germany's economic de­
velopment it is only necessary to recall how divided the Ger­
man world still remained as late as the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.
"Until the nineteenth century the Germans made less 
progress towards national unity than the other peoples of
^Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Indus­
trial Revolution (New York; Viking Press, 1939), p. 180.
Walter W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 38.
^J. H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France 
and Germany (3d ed,; London: Cambridge University Press,
1928), pp. 283-284.
^Ibid., pp. 96-97. Also Pounds, op. cit., and W. O. 
Henderson, The Industrial Revolution in Europe, 1815-1914 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961).
Western Europe.”  ̂ The Reformation and religious wars of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, far from helping to 
unify the Germans as had happened in Britain, deepened their 
divisions. What semblance of unity had been provided by the 
Holy Roman Empire (of which it has been said that it was 
neither holy nor Roman) was weakened by the Peace of West­
phalia of 1648 concluding the bloody Thirty Years War.
"In the century and a half which followed the peace 
settlement Germany remained a mosaic of more than 1,800 pol­
itical entities, ranging in size and influence from the sev­
enty-seven major secular principalities down to the fifty-one
Imperial cities, forty-five Imperial villages and 1,475 ter-
2ritories ruled by Imperial knights."
By the end of the Napoleonic wars a marked change 
had been wrought in this extreme fragmentation, though Ger­
many still remained badly divided. In the course of remaking 
the map of Germany, Napoleon drastically reduced the number 
of states. Even so, the Congress of Vienna, after the wars, 
divided Germany into no fewer than thirty-nine separate
1E. J. Passant, A Short History of Germany, 1815- 
1945 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 1.
2Ibid.
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states, the largest of which were Austria and Prussia and 
several of the smallest of which were little more than in­
significant principalities. Thus Germany was still hardly 
more than a "geographical expression."
The devastating effect on commerce of these archaic 
political divisions was aptly described by a German news­
paper of the period.
Thus we have instead of one Germany, 39 German 
states, an equal number of governments, almost the 
same number of courts, as many representative bodies,
39 distinct legal codes and administrations, embas­
sies, and consulates . . .  in these 39 states pre­
vail as many separate interests which injure aund 
destroy each other down to the last detail of daily 
intercourse. No post can be hurried, no mailing 
charge reduced without special conventions, no 
railway can be planned without each seeking to keep 
it in his own state as long as possible.^
In view of difficulties thus created not only for 
economic progress but for ordinary commerce, it is no wonder 
that growing pressures developed for rationalization of the 
existing political structure. These pressures found increas­
ing expression not only among the commercial classes but also
among a growing proportion of the educated middle class in
2the free professions and in industry.
^Quoted in Theodore S. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolu- 
tion, Reaction (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,
1958), p. 17.
2Passant, op. cit., p. 26.
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But Germany’s political disunity was doomed perhaps 
more by swift economic and technological change than by any­
thing else.
The Customs Union Movement 
Because of the grave hindrances to commerce repre­
sented by the patchwork of states and principalities, cus­
toms unions began to be formed as early as 1828. Prussia, 
the largest and most powerful state in Germany other than 
Austria, was the leader of one of these. By means of shrewd 
and aggressive commercial policies in which full use was made 
of her territorial advantages and greater financial power, 
Prussia by 1834 expanded this union into a greater one called 
the Zollverein.^ Besides Prussia, it included the larger 
German states of Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg and most of
the smaller ones, with a total population of twenty-three
2and one-half million. Within eight years several others 
joined so that by 1842, except for Austria, only the Kingdom 
of Hanover and a few other lesser states in the north remain-
Ibid., p. 66. See also Shepard Bancroft Clough and 
Charles Woolsey Cole, Economic History of Europe (Boston:
D. C. Heath & Co., 1941), p. 457.
2Passant, op. cit., p. 66.
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ed outside.^ It became a cornerstone of Prussian policy to 
exclude Austria from the Zollverein. The relations between 
Austria smd Prussia carry a special significance and receive 
further description below.
Henderson writes that
the Zollverein was founded after fifteen years of 
bitter economic strife that followed the issue of 
Prussia’s tariff of May, 1818. The notion that it 
was set up as the result of the rise of German nat­
ional consciousness and was a touching exanqple of 
brotherly cooperation will not bear examination 
for a moment . . . The states concerned fou^it for 
their own narrow interests and many of them joined 
the Zollverein only when economic depression and 
empty exchequers made further resistance to Prussia 
impossible.
All states on entering the Zollverein automatically
adopted the Prussian tariff and shared in revenues in pro-
3portion to their populations. Duties were low for that 
time. Raw materials were admitted duty-free. The duties 
on manufactured articles averaged only 10 per cent ad valo­
rem, while rates on tropical products ranged from 20 to 30
^Ibid., p. 67. _
O. Henderson, The Zollverein (1st U, S. ed.; 
Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1959), p. 95.
3E. Strauss, Common Sense About the Common Market 
(London: George Allen & Unwin. New York: Rinehart & Co.,
1958), p. 25. Also Passant, op. cit., p. 68.
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per cent ad valorem.^ The Cambridge historian, J. H. Clap­
ham, termed the Prussian tariff of 1818 "immeasurably the 
wisest and most scientific tariff then existing among the 
great powers." There was a tendency for the Zollverein 
tariff to rise gradually, especially by the 1840’s, probably 
in some degree under the influence of Friedrich List who had
secured the sympathetic ear of German industrialists with his
3National System of Political Economy. But a reversal of 
this tendency took place in the next two decades, and Germany 
proper remained a low-tariff area until after the founding
4of the Empire. If the influence of English free-trade doc­
trines on Prussian policy-makers is part of the explanation 
for a low-tariff policy, so also is the fact that such a po­
licy fitted in well with Prussian determination to keep 
Austria out of the Zollverein.^
^W. O. Henderson, op. cit., p. 40. Also Clough and 
Cole, op. cit., p. 457.
2ClaphcUB, op. cit., p. 97. Also Herbert Heaton, 
Economic History of Europe (2d ed. rev.; New York; Harper 
& Brothers, 1948), p. 642.
p. 179.
3Clapham, op. cit., p. 101. Also Henderson, op. cit..
4Clapham, op. cit., pp. 315-16.
^W. O. Henderson, The Genesis of the Common Market
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), p. 107.
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Prussian-Austrian Relations 
Austrian relations with Prussia and the rest of Ger­
many, especially with respect to Austria’s position and atti­
tude toward the Zollverein, are of special significance. 
Austria emerged from the Napoleonic era the undisputed leader 
of the German world. All of her dominions to the east, how­
ever, which constituted the bulk of her territory, were non- 
Germanic. Therefore, they were not in the Germanic Confeder­
ation formed after the Congress of Vienna to replace the old 
Holy Roman Enqjire. Austrian interests, thus, were necessar­
ily divided, and it was difficult for the government to form­
ulate policy in relations with the German states in disregard 
of the impact of that policy on the rest of the Empire. A 
policy which would have strengthened the Austrian position 
in Germany was apt to react adversely on the economy of the 
eastern provinces.^ This dilemma was not greatly different
from that which confronted Britain in defining policy toward
2the Common Market in 1962.
^Strauss, op. cit., p. 27.
^At the time British opinion was sharply divided on 
the question of seeking membership in the Common Market, a 
step which eventually would have come in conflict with Com­
monwealth preference. Britain's application was rejected, 
thus postponing the necessity of making a final decision on 
whether to abandon the principle of Commonwealth preference,
13
Austria remained the dominant power in the Germanic 
Confederation until about the mid-1850's. After that her 
influence began to wane, almost imperceptibly at first. The 
fundamental cause of this gradual loss of leadership was 
the slower pace of economic development in Austria as com­
pared with that in the territory covered by the Zollverein 
and especially in Prussia itself.^ Western and northern 
Germany was experiencing rapid industrial progress through­
out this period, but much of the Austrian Empire remained 
predominantly agrarian, while its industries were slow to 
modernize. At times her leaders sought to force a way for
Austria into the Zollverein in order to retain a strategic
2role in Germany. At other times they tried to break up the 
Prussian-led customs union by inducing the important southern
3German states to withdraw. Prussia leadership, dedicated 
to keeping Austria out, not only was successful in that res­
pect, but also in holding the union together despite occas­
ional internal crises. Its success was facilitated by the
^Henderson, The Genesis of the Common Maorket, p. 107. 
Also Strauss, op. cit., p. 27.
Clapham, op. cit., pp. 315-16. Also Strauss, op. 
cit., p. 27.
^Henderson, The Genesis of the Common Market, p. 106.
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relative inefficiency of Austrian industries and their need 
for high protection.^ By keeping the Zollverein's import 
duties low in line with prevailing sentiment, Prussia pract­
ically assured the exclusion of Austria, many of whose pro­
ducers would have found it impossible to survive if exposed 
to outside competition. When in 1854 Prussia was able to 
secure the renewal of the Zollverein treaties with all its 
existing members and gain the adhesion of Hanover besides, 
Austria in effect lost its last chance to destroy or dominate 
the Zollverein, The renewal of these treaties placed Prussia
at the head of a customs union with a population of thirty-
2six million and greatly strengthened her hand in Germany,
The War of 1866 
Twelve years later the issue of leadership in Germany 
was finally laid to rest by the War of 1866. In seven weeks 
Austria was crushed, though now allied militarily with the 
other major states of the Zollverein against Prussia. "The 
links which had been forged between Prussia and other members 
of the Zollverein were not strong enough to prevent Hanover
^Clapham, op. cit., p. 316.
2Henderson, The Genesis of the Common Market, p.
107.
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and the south German states from becoming Austria's allies. 
Political antipathy proved to be more powerful than econo­
mic interests.”  ̂ True to the fears of German businessmen, 
the Zollverein was legally dissolved, but unforseen by them, 
it in fact continued to operate. For the war actually prov­
ed the importance of the customs union to its member states 
and their economies. The Zollverein treaties automatically 
lapsed with the beginning of hostilities, but there was no 
interruption in the collection of duties and their dispatch 
to Berlin, the Prussian capital. They were then divided
according to the old agreements, even to those states now
2in arms against Prussia. This remarkable procedure can 
either be viewed as a cynical policy of business as usual 
or as a demonstration of the moderate nineteenth century 
concepts of war and nationalism.
In the post-war settlement Prussia annexed Hanover 
outright along with several other north German states, all 
of which were organized into the North German Confederation.
The other members were the same south German states as had
3been members before the war. , Austria, though receiving
^Ibid., p . 108•
2Ibid.# Also Strauss, op. cit., p. 40.
3Henderson, The Genesis of the Common Market, p. 109,
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generous treaty terms from the astute Bismarck, was perma­
nently expelled from Germany proper*
Political Unity Attained 
The final act in the drama of unification was not 
played until 1871, and once more it was a war that forced 
the issue. Bismarck "planned" the war against France but 
very cleverly maneuvered the French emperor into taking the 
role of the aggressor.^ The South German states were now 
on the side of Prussia against the common enemy, France.
Again it was a short war, lasting less than six months, at 
the end of which France was thoroughly defeated.
"While the war was in progress, one after another 
of the South German states had been admitted to Confedera­
tion; Bismarck had gradually overcome the opposition of the 
monarchs, including William [King of Prussia] himself, to 
the imperial project; and on January 18, ten days before the 
capitulation of Paris, William I had been acclaimed German
emperor by the assembled princes in the Hall of Mirrors at 
2Versailles." Thus Bismarck had created a German Empire with 
the King of Prussia as hereditary emperor.
^John Hammer ton suid Harry Elmer Barnes, The Illustra- 
ed World History (New York: Wm. H. Wise & Co., 1938), p. 898,
^Ibid., p. 900.
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By the creation of the German Empire the German peo­
ple at last achieved political unity. Practically all the 
German-speaking peoples of Europe except the Austrians, the 
Luxembourgers, and the people of the small state of Lichen- 
stein, were now united in a single Reich. The achievement, 
however, was not so much the result of a general consensus, 
either of the people or their leaders, as it was of the poli­
cies and actions of Prussian statesmen, especially in the 
later years, of Bismarck/* The Zollverein played a large 
part in the process, but its success was due almost entirely 
to Prussian leadership. Other states were frequently reluc­
tant to join and did so only under economic duress. Economic 
decay aud depression would very likely have been their lot
The idea of German nationalism, though talked about 
and advocated by a wide variety of writers and men of affairs 
for many years, was opposed not only by the majority of the 
princes but by quite a large body of the people. " . . . to 
the main body of the nobility and even to many of the middle 
class, nationalism, with its threat to the local court and 
to the traditional ordering of society and with its leveling 
inqplications as deriving from the French Revolution, became 
as repugnant as to the sovereign prince himself." — Passamt, 
op. cit., p. 15. Nationalism evoked little interest even 
among the kings of Prussia as is clearly implied in the quo­
tation from Hammerton and Barnes above. A concrete example 
is the action of Prussian king in giving a de facto rejection 
of the offer of the Constitutional Assembly assembled in 
Frankfurt-on-Main in 1849 to make him a constitutional mon­
arch of a unified Reich. See Passant, op. cit.. pp. 34-35, 
and Henderson, The Zollverein, pp. 195-196.
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had they remained outside,^ Even as members they continued 
restive, and more than once a breakup of the Zollverein was 
a possibility. Prussia’s partners were understandably jea­
lous of her power and regarded her domination of the customs 
union with distrust. "Some states desired to weaken the 
Zollverein even at the cost of reviving tariff barriers
3throughout Germany." Prussia made membership financially 
attractive by the method of division of customs receipts. 
Distribution on the basis of population caused the smaller 
states, with few exceptions, to draw more from the Zollver­
ein them they paid in as receipts. This also applied to the 
larger states except Saxony. Prussia itself contributed con­
siderably more in the form of customs receipts to the treas-
4ury than it kept as its share of the revenues.
It would be easy to exaggerate the contribution of 
the Zollverein to the economic development of Germany in the 
approximate half century of its existence. Nonetheless, it
1Henderson, The Zollverein, p. 95. Also Strauss, op. 
cit., p. 24.
Henderson, The Zollverein, pp. 190-95. Also Passant, 
op. cit.. p. 68.
3Passant, loc. cit.
^Henderson, The Genesis of the Common Market, pp. 103- 
104. Also Strauss, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
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is hard to conceive of Germany's becoming the leading indus­
trial state on the continent during this period except under 
some type of regime which would be equal to the problem of 
overcoming the restrictions which antedated the formation of 
the Zollverein. True, that regime need not inevitably have 
been the customs unionk known as the Zollverein. It might 
have tcücen any of several other forms, as Henderson has point­
ed out, or have been organized under the joint leadership of 
Austria and Prussia, or Austria alone.^ That it achieved the 
success it did over serious outside opposition and general 
distrust of Prussia by the other German states was due in no 
small part, according to Henderson, to the dedication and 
skill of important but little known Prussian civil servants 
who carried on the periodic negotiations and the planning 
necessary for the survival and growth of thq union. "The
Zollverein is the contribution of the Prussian Civil Service
2to the founding of the German Empire."
Zollverein and Common Market Contrasted 
These two institutions separated in time by a hundred
^ h e  Zollverein, p. 342.
2Ibid., p. 343.
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years have certain basic similarities, mainly in purpose and 
principle. These similarities have already been well cover­
ed in several books, among them those from which we have 
quoted. It is possible, however, to push these similarities 
too far. By doing so one can read into the Common Market's 
development certain dangerous implications concerning its 
use by Germany for economic penetration and domination of 
Europe. This is part of Strauss' thesis. His analysis can 
be taken as representative of this point of view, though per­
haps some readers would consider it a little on the extreme 
side. Let us look a little more closely at some of his ideas. 
For this purpose some quotations from his book Common Sense 
about the Common Market will suffice. In this volume he has 
skillfully blended both historical and technical economic 
criteria to support his argument.
"In brief, from the German point of view the Common 
Market plan is an economic gold mine and German policy has 
naturally been intent on ensuring its success."^ "The Com­
mon Market Treaty . . .  has made it plain for all to see, 
except for the wilfully blind, that in the structure of any 
future European Union Germany will occupy the ground floor
^Strauss, op. cit., p. 85.
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and not the basement.”  ̂ By committing the future of Euro­
pean economic integration to the care of Western Germsmy,
the signatories of the Treaty of 25th March 1957 have em-
2barked on an unjustifiable gamble. "The result has been 
the emergence of an economic block, dominated in all essen­
tials by broadly overlapping powers of big business and Wes­
tern Germany but making considerable allowance for the special 
interests of its other member states and for those of the 
farming community in all Common Market countries." And 
finally,
This issue is not whether there shall be European 
economic integration, but what form it will take.
If the conception underlying the Common Market 
Treaty should win the day, it will be increasing­
ly dominated by a highly dynamic but basically 
unstable Germany, politically divided and there­
by unbalanced in more senses than one, capable 
of drawing its neighbours into its sphere of in­
fluence not through hope of common benefits but 
through fear of the consequences of staying out­
side. This development will not be prevented by 
a device permitting British business to share in 
the advantages of such an arrangement on more or 
less even terms with Germany, and with equally 
little concern for the effects of such a solution 
on Europe as a whole. In such a contest, the ad-
^Ibid., p. 121. 
^Ibid., p. 127. 
^Ibid., p. 136.
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vantage would easily lie with Germany, just as 
it was with Prussia a century ago, when it used 
the German Zollverein for the purpose of estab­
lishing a firm base for future expansion, while 
Austria-Hungary hovered at the periphery of Ger­
many, undecided until too late where its main 
interests lay. Read Britain for Austria-Hungary 
and European Economic Community for the Zollver­
ein, and despite the inevitable weaknesses of 
such analogies the similarity is too close for 
comfort.1
In this and the following chapter, our interest is 
in inquiring further into the reasonableness of two propo­
sitions: First, that the Zollverein and the Common Market
are comparable institutions, at least in regard to their 
serviceableness as devices to further the expansionist ten­
dencies of a dominant member; and second, that the Common 
Market was inspired and is being guided to an important de­
gree by German interests.
Concerning the former, several considerations drama­
tize the basic differences between the Zollverein and the 
Common Market. For example, the Zollverein embraced nearly 
thirty separate political states and principalities, the ma­
jority of which were too small to be of much significance 
separately in the economic world. So large a conglomeration 
of sovereignties probably could not have been held together 
long except under the tutelage and eventually the domination
\ bid., p. 157.
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of a single strong power. Besides having clear and undis­
puted economic superiority over her partners, Prussia 
occupied a "straggling position across most of central and 
northern Germany" which enabled her to levy a heavy toll on 
a large part of the transit trade passing between northern 
seaports and southern Germany and Austria.^ As a consequence, 
states on these routes were given a strong incentive to en­
ter the Zollverein to escape these duties. Prussian lever­
age, therefore, not only was considerable but was probably 
indispensable for controlling the centrifugal forces operat­
ing in Germany at that time. These conditions are contrasted 
with those in the Common Market in which there are but six 
members. Luxembourg, it is true, is very small compared to 
the others, but since it is virtually part of Belgium for 
economic considerations, its diminutiveness is not especially 
significant. Nor can we find a member, not even West Ger­
many, whose size and strategic superiority is comparable to 
that of Prussia in the Zollverein.
Another consideration which differentiates the Zoll­
verein from the Common Market is its clear identification 
?ith:the nationalistic aspirations of a people having a com­
mon language and culture. Separtist sentiment was a constant
^Strauss, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
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hindrance to strengthening the internal bonds within the 
Zollverein, but at the same time there was a growing con­
viction among the commercial classes especially, that little 
progress was possible without the continuance of the Zoll­
verein and that the Germans needed to be united in one nation 
like most of the other peoples of western Europe. Nor did 
suggestions to extend the Zollverein to non-German states 
such as Holland, Switzerland, Belgium and Denmark, elicit a 
favorable response from Prussian leaders. Sound economic 
arguments for extending the customs union to these nations 
probably could have been made, but Prussian statesmen believed 
that the Zollverein should continue as a peculiarly German 
institution.^
In contrast, the Common Market is identified with 
no one nationality and must therefore depend for its cohesion 
on a willingness of the populations of the member states to 
submerge traditional national loyalties. No less important 
in securing its acceptance by these diverse peoples is per­
haps a widely held belief that a higher material welfare is 
more likely to result if their separate national economies
are integrated into a single European economy. All countries 
in the Common Market possess governments which are popularly
^Henderson, The Zollverein, p. 339.
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supported, and this, too, is in contrast with the earlier 
state of affairs in nineteenth century Germany in which few 
of the governments were regularly accountable to the people. 
Apparently the institutions of the Common Market now have to 
have the backing of a majority of the people in each of the 
six countries. Any other conclusion would appear to be in­
compatible with the stability of these institutions.^
Another point of significance in contrasting the 
Common Market with the Zollverein is that the former was 
founded by a formal treaty in which the participating nat­
ions deliberately planned the integration of their separate 
economies. Furthermore, political unification, though not 
attempted or even suggested by the Treaty of Rome, was re­
garded as a desirable goal by a number of European leaders 
if economic integration could be made to succeed. Political 
unity in Europe will probably be difficult to achieve, but 
public statements of quite a few of the prominent leaders of 
the Common Market countries indicate that they still look
There is no intention to suggest that this may con­
tinue to be true. If recent actions by the French govern­
ment reflect the feeling of a majority of the French people, 
their acceptance of Common Market developments may be coming 
to an end.
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upon it as something worth working and planning for.^ For 
the most part, this desire for political unity was not felt 
by the rulers of the member states of the Zollverein. We 
have seen that there was frequently a great reluctance on 
the part of the German states other than Prussia to join and 
stay in the Zollverein. They chafed under Prussian leader­
ship and even went to war with Prussia while the Zollverein 
continued to function. To relinquish their sovereignty and 
perhaps to lose their identity in a unified German nation 
seems not to have been something which was welcomed by the 
member states.
These considerations seem to weaken appreciably the
^Two of many examples may be cited. ”A political 
union is bound to come. The Common Market is merely a pre­
liminary step to such a union. The Market has already pene­
trated so deeply into the life of Europe that further union 
is, in my opinion, inevitable." --Konrad Adenauer, in Look 
magazine, XXVII, No. 25, p. 28. "Do I need to add that, 
from the political viewpoint even more, the merger [of the 
European Communities ] , by giving new impetus to economic 
cooperation, cannot fail to have fruitful consequences for 
what continues to be our goal, I mean the political union 
of Europe." --French Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice 
Couve de Murville, before the French National Assembly, Oct­
ober 29, 1963. Quoted in European Community, No. 67, (Wash­
ington, D. C.: European Community Information Service, 1963),
p. 12. It must be conceded that the term 'political union' 
is a rather elastic concept, meaning different things to dif­
ferent people. It has begun to appear that the conception of 
political union held by French government leaders may vary by 
a wide margin from what other European leaders have in mind.
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case for drawing a close analogy between the Zollverein and 
the Common Market, at least in the manner in which Strauss 
has done.
The Situation of Austria suid England Compared
We have seen that Austria sought to join the Zoll­
verein on more than one occasion in order to bolster her 
fading position in Germany. A cardinal principle of Prus­
sian policy was to exclude Austria, the obvious reason being 
that she did not want a rival for her dominant role. In the 
present day, England at times has acted as though she wants 
in the Common Market to avoid further exclusion from Europe, 
though many of the British apparently are not convinced that 
it would be to their country's benefit. On at least one oc­
casion Britain began formal negotiations with the Common 
Market nations on terms of entry, but the discussions hardly 
got off the ground due to French objections. At these dis­
cussions Germauiy was one of Britain's advocates. In the 
Common Market, therefore, Germany has acted in a manner just 
the opposite of Prussia's manner in her treatment of Austria
1with respect to the latter's quest for Zollverein membership.
^France's behavior has more nearly resembled that of 
Prussia, but her reasons may have been entirely different.
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Summary
The differences between the Zollverein and the Com­
mon Market may be summarized under the following points.
(1) The Zollverein brought under one common customs 
administration as many as thirty separate states and juris­
dictions, most of which in time came to accept the Prussian 
tariff, customs laws and procedure. It was largely a crea­
ture of Prussia and very probably could not have been held 
together except by Prussian pressure and persuasion. The 
Common Market, on the other hand, is made up of only six 
states and shows no comparable concentration of economic 
power, though West Germany is clearly the leading member.
(2) The Zollverein was pre-eminently a German in­
stitution and as such derived some support from elements 
within Germany which were strongly in favor of German unity. 
Yet it had no broad base of support from the masses simply 
because there was no electorate having an effective voice. 
The member states of the Common Market are representative 
democracies with more diverse traditions and cultures. Its 
continuance and permanence therefore is more dependent on 
the mass support of the voting populations of these states.
^Strauss, op. cit., p. 25
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a condition which med&es it more difficult for any member to 
control and dominate the Community.
(3) The legal basis for the Zollverein was treaties 
between the members which ran for specified periods of time 
and had to be renewed, usually every eight years.^ The cus­
toms union was the Germans' answer in the economic field to 
their political disunity and an expedient for preventing 
that disunity from crippling their internal trade. For many 
years there was little serious effort to create national 
unity in a political sense. The Common Market, on the other 
hand, was founded by a single treaty of indefinite duration 
which programs the progressive integration of the member 
states' economies. European leaders involved in it have not
shrunk from openly advocating the eventual conversion of the
2Common Market into a political federation.
Presumably this does not exhaust the possibilities 
in contrasting the Zollverein with the Common Market. The
^Passant, op. cit., p. 68.
^Walter Hallstein, president of the Common Market 
Commission, recently stated the direction in which he thought 
the European Economic Community was moving, as follows:"There 
is . . , another more important feature of integration, by 
which it is akin to federation: it is a dynamic concept,
that is to say its very implementation constantly creates new 
reasons for widening the field of integration." — Community 
Topics 17 (European Community Information Service, 1964), p. 
8.
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differences mentioned are only those which have a bearing 
on the problem which is the subject of the study. I have 
not intended to imply that these two institutions are in no 
way comparable, something which is manifestly not true. Both 
were founded first as customs unions to which other features 
were added. What began as a movement to free trade among 
separate states within a well-defined region, in the one case 
became after thirty-seven years a new nation state, and in 
the other has brought the western tier of the continent of 
Europe a little closer to political federation than it has 
ever been before.
In the next chapter we explore further aspects of the 
Common Market's development with special reference to the 




Before presenting and analyzing data in the fields 
of balance of payments and trade, it may be appropriate for 
the purpose of the study to review briefly the events which 
led up to the organization of the European Economic Commun­
ity. The purpose here will be to find whether there is any 
ground for believing with Mr. Strauss that the Common Mar­
ket plan was fated, perhaps by design, to enhance what was 
thought to be the already dominant position of the West Ger­
man economy. Mr. Strauss observes that, "The unmistakable 
power centre of the new block is the German Federal Republic 
directed by the rulers of German industry, which has success* 
fully harnessed the urges and aspirations of the dominant 
social forces and the hopes and fears of many people in West­
ern Europe to the service of a combination promising to be 
of great benefit to Western Germany in general and to its
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business interests in particular."^ He further notes that 
"the failure of earlier American-inspired attempts at [Euro­
pean] economic integration makes it clear that this force 
must act from the centre of the area and not on its periphery; 
and the fundamental difference between the present scheme and 
earlier plans is the existence of such a force in the shape
of Western Germany under its present very able business lea- 
2dership."
Initiative by Holland and Belgium 
If these views are substantially correct, one would 
presumably expect to find that the Germans were unusually 
active in initiating and promoting discussions which led to 
the Common Market Treaty. Mr. Strauss, however, notes ear­
lier that at the Messina Conference of the six member states 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (formed in 1952)
"the representatives of Holland and Belgium took the formal 
initiative which led to the agreement on the formation of a
3general common market between these countries." We are




caused to wonder why these two smaller but relatively indus­
trially advanced nations should have elected to push for an 
enlargement of the Coal and Steel Community into a general 
common market if it was destined to be a threat to their own 
industries, uncompensated by other advantages.^ Both the 
Dutch and the Belgians, according to Strauss, are "trading
partners par excellence whose economies are dominated by the
2needs of their foreign trade," Small countries such as these, 
which must live by their trade to a greater degree than their 
larger neighbors, are almost invariably low-tariff nations. 
Consequently, membership in a customs union more extensive 
than that already in existence between themselves (Benelux) 
would serve to assure them of access to vital markets, an ad­
vantage which in their case would hardly be considered unim­
portant. Strauss says as much when he mentions that "Their 
main interest in the common maurket lies in the consolidation
Belgium had a good example before it at that time 
of what a common market can do to some of a nation's indus­
tries. Some of its coal mines were being gradually shut down 
as the result of increased competition from more efficient 
German mines following the inauguration of the Coal and Steel 
Community in 1953. However, it was expected that this would 
happen, and plans were made by the Community to ease the ad­
justment. See J. E. Meade, H. H. Liesner and S. J. Wells, 
Case Studies in European Economic Union (London: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1962), pp. 288-309.
2Strauss, gp> cit., p. 85.
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of their trading areas for which Benelux provided little more 
than a start." He says next that "The very urgency of this 
conception for their economic future . . .  limits their area 
of manoeuvre compared with that of larger countries less vi­
tally concerned in the success of the scheme.
It would be a great oversimplification to assume mere> 
ly because the Benelux countries took the formal initiative 
in the negotiations that it was through their design that the 
Common Market Treaty was adopted. In the years before the 
adoption of the Treaty of Rome a number of dedicated states­
men representing every nation whicb later joined the Common
Market worked towards a solution of the problems of Europe
2through greater cooperation among its nations. Their ef­
forts finally began to mature in 1953 with the founding of 
the European Coal and Steel Community. The movement receiv­
ed a temporary setback in August 1954, when the French fail­
ed to ratify the newly projected European Defense Community. 
But less than a year later, in June 1955, came the Messina
^Ibid.
2Three excellent accounts of movement for European 
cooperation are given in Henderson, The Genesis of the Com­
mon Market, pp. 131-70; Richard Mayne, The Community of 
Europe (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962), pp. 68-131;
and Walter Hallstein, United Europe, Challenge and Oppor­
tunity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 6-29.
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Conference which authorized the committee of national repre­
sentatives to work on a plan for a general common market.
The so-called Spaak Report, on which the Common Market Treaty 
was largely based, was finished in i^ril 1956 and adopted by 
the ministers of the six nations as a basis for negotiating 
a common market treaty. After less than a year of negotia­
tions by the national representatives, the Treaty was signed 
on March 25, 1957, On January 1, 1958, the Treaty went into 
effect, having been formally ratified by the governments of 
the six members. Hallstein says that the speed of the achie­
vement attests not only to the ability of the men responsible 
but also to the power and appeal of the postwar European 
idea.^ It also suggests that both among the negotiators and 
the parliamentary delegations there was a sense of urgency 
that the future of their nations and of Europe was bound up 
with the success of efforts to achieve greater cooperation.
Broadly Based Movement 
In reading accounts of the movement for European eco­
nomic integration we find no suggestion that Germans had any 
more influence than the statesmen and representatives of other 
European nations. Leadership in the movement seems to have
^Hallstein, op. cit., p. 16-17.
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been very well shared. It might even be reasonably argued 
that the Germans contributed fewer than their proportionate 
share to a list of these five or six names most prominently 
identified with the formation of the Eurc^ean Communities 
in general and the Common Market in particular. For example, 
the Coal auid Steel Community was based on the Schuman Plan, 
named for Robert Schuman, France's foreign minister in 1950, 
whose later life was dedicated to the "elimination of the 
age-old opposition between France and Germany."^ The man 
often given most credit for the founding of the Common Mar­
ket is emother Frenchman, Jean Monnet. Monnet served as the 
first president of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel 
Community. On resigning this post after the collapse of the 
European Defense Community proposal, he organized the Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe, an organization 
that, according to Mayne, did outstanding work in mobilizing
public and official opinion in support of the Common Market 
2Treaty. Serving with Monnet on the Committee were such pro­
minent national party leaders as Erich Ollenhauer, the German 
Socialist; Maurice Faure, of the French Radical Party; and
^Hallstein, op. cit., p. 10. 
2Mayne, op. cit., p. 110.
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Guy Mollet, the French Socialist leader.^ The chief archi­
tects of the Spaak Report were the forceful Belgian Social­
ist leader, Paul-Henri Spaak; the Frenchman, Pierre Uri; and
Dirk Spierenburg, a Dutch representative on the High Autho-
2rity of the Coal and Steel Community.
Concessions to France 
As we saw earlier, Holland and Belgium took the for­
mal initiative in opening negotiations which eventually led 
to the adoption of the Common Market Treaty. The negotiations 
themselves, though consummated in a remarkably short time 
considering the sharp differences which had to be compromis-
3ed, were not without difficulty. The country which is re­
garded by several economists as having gained the most con-
4cessions from the bargaining was France. For example, the 
Treaty conferred association status on a number of colonies 
and former colonies of the six members auid set up a Develop­




4See, for example, Mayne, op. cit., pp. 122-23, and 
Henderson, The Genesis of the Common Market, p . 158.
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in Africa.^ But most of these non-European associates were 
dependencies or former colonies of France, very few had links 
with Belgium, Holland or Italy, and none was a dependency of 
Germany. Germany, however, made as large a contribution to 
the Fund as France, Another important provision which the 
French fought for and secured was one which set as its ob­
jective the "progressive harmonization" of economic and soc­
ial policies such as those having to do with the length of 
the workweek and overtime wage rates. If harmonization of 
these policies is carried out, it would result in the rais­
ing of production costs in the member countries other than
France and thus would confer at least some temporary compe-
2titive advantage on French exports.
A second association convention went into effect 
June 1, 1964, It creates a free trade area between the six 
EEC members and the associated states while retaining some 
protection for the developing industries of the African asso­
ciates. The associates benefit from intra-Community reduct­
ions in tariffs and the elimination of quotas. In addition, 
certain tropical products now enter the EEC duty free. The 
African associates will eliminate customs duties, quantita­
tive restrictions, and certain taxes on imports from EEC 
countries except in cases where an influx of imports might 
endanger their infant industries. The associates also bene­
fit from financial and technical cooperation.— Undated in­
formation bulletin (European Community Information Service).
2The principle of harmonization of the type envision­
ed in the Common Market has been criticized as unsound by 
some economists. See Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic 
Integration (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961),
p. 214.
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Some Criticism in Germany 
Given German membership in the Common Market, we 
must assume that German leaders, in general, have believed 
the arrangement to be not unfavorable to Germany’s future 
development. There was a body of opinion in Germany, how­
ever, which found much fault with the plan and voiced serious 
reservations about it at various times. The most influential 
and articulate critic was Ludwig Erhard, at that time the 
economics minister and the present chancellor. We are told 
by Emile Benoit that any dissension which the formation of 
the European Free Trade Association was intended by some of 
its leaders to create among the EEC nations had its most 
telling effect on the weakest spot in the Community’s soli­
darity, i. e., elements in the German business community, 
for whom Dr. Erhard served as spokesman, which had always 
been lukewarm toward the Common Market.^
This may be verified by reading some of Erhard's 
statements. For example, in an article in the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung of December 31, 1959, he criticized the 
pressure for harmonization of social policies advocated by
^Europe at Sixes and Sevens (New York; Columbia 
University Press, 1961), p. 86.
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some Europeans: "Perhaps it is fear of the incalculable,
of something quite unforeseeable happening on the road to 
European integration that explains why so many of these 
'social mechanics' are constantly appealing for 'harmoniza­
tion'". "The misconceived word 'harmonization' must mean 
that national economies, joined together in a common effort, 
must accept the worst economic, financial and monetary blun­
ders committed by any one partner as binding upon all, in­
stead of accepting a corporate obligation to eradicate such 
2weaknesses." "To shape the future one must be able to see 
the present in its full context, in terms of its dynamic 
forces and its development trends, and one must know how to 
exploit these. The 'urge to organize and harmonize', on the
3other hand, leads almost certainly to disaster."
With reference to the growing concern over the sep­
aration of Europe into two rival trade blocs, Erhard said:
I shall always be in favour of a rapprochement and 
the removal of all discrimination inside free Europe 
. . .  Until now the situation has not taken a drama­
tic turn, for the lowering of tariffs within the two
^Ludwig Erhard, The Economics of Success (Princeton, N. 
J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1963), p. 265.
^Ibid., p . 266.
^Ibid., p. 267.
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economic areas has only just begun. The deimage 
has not yet become fully apparent. But no one 
will ever convince me that the developments set 
in motion by the Common Market will only bring 
material changes in trade ... . The inherent 
logic of two separate economic units must lead 
to a widening of the gap between them . . .
This is a trend which must on no account be 
allowed to continue. And it is my firm con­
viction that it will not continue. I admit 
that Germany's position in the world economy 
does not permit her the luxury of isolation, 
but I believe that a country like Austria is 
still less able to afford it.^
These statements by Erhard indicate at that time 
profound misgivings about the operation of the Common Mar­
ket both in its internal and external effects. According 
to his premises, balamce in payments among the members of 
a customs union in which each state has its own currency 
and monetary policy can best be maintained by mobility of
Ibid., p. 339. Concern for the effect on European 
trade of a continuation of two trade blocs has been voiced 
by some national leaders among the European Free Trade Asso­
ciation nations. Recently in a speech in Paris, Knut Hammer- 
skjold. Deputy Secretary General of EFTA, is quoted in the 
EFTA Reporter as follows: " . . .  the refusal by France in 
Jamuary, 1963, to allow Britain and, in consequence, some of 
her partners to enter the Common Market created a situation 
which, in its essentials is still with us today . . .  We are, 
in short, faced with a stalemate regarding a possible merger 
of the two trading groups," --EFTA Reporter. Feb. 8, 1965. 
Hallstein emphatically disputes that EEC policies have deep­
ened the division or that the EEC nations have shown a lack 
of concern about the future of European and world trade. "The 
Treaty of Rome pledges the Community to a liberal commercial 
policy . . .  Its own interest guides it in the same direction." 
— Community Topics 17 (European Community Information Service, 
1965). The statesmen of both the EEC and EFTA place great im­
portance on the outcome of the Kennedy Round of trade negotia­
tions.
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resources, monetary discipline, and the maintenance, rather 
than the avoidance, of the competitive principle. Harmoni­
zation as it is commonly conceived would, according to Erhard 
and kindred minds, hamper the growth of intraregional trade 
and at the same time could convert the union into a more and 
more exclusive group having a reduced volume of trade with 
the rest of the world.
If these opinions are representative of the thinking 
of more than one influential German —  and it is implausible 
to think they would be narrowly shared by a very small group 
if they were held by the economics minister —  they indicate 
an absence of enthusiasm, at least among some Germans, for 
the way in which the Common Market was constituted. Such a 
lack of enthusiasm would be out of keeping with the proposi­
tion that Germans exercised more than their proportionate 
share of influence in the promotion and adoption of the Com­
mon Market Plan.
Summary
In this chapter we have seen that the Common Market 
was launched, as we would eaqpect, through the cooperative 
efforts of the leaders of the several nations involved. There 
seems little reason to think that the Germans had an undue 
amount of influence on its construction. A case may even be
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made, perhaps, for the proposition that the French exercised 
the greatest influence: a number of their leaders were at
the forefront in the integration movement, and concessions 
won by France in the actual negotiations were by no means 
insignificant.
In the next chapter we begin to look at some recent 
statistics for objective evidence of the presence or absence 
of undue benefits for Germany in the gradual effectuation of 
the Common Market as well as for evidence of adverse effects 
experienced by any of her partners.
CHAPTER IV 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
As an analytical device for detemmining the effect 
of the inauguration of a common market on its members, the 
balance of payments is much less than adequate. This is due 
to the fact that it summarizes a nation’s payments position 
not with its partners but with the world. Nevertheless, the 
balance of payments can provide clues which can then be veri­
fied or eliminated by resorting to other kinds of data that 
may be more narrowly confined to intramarket trade relations 
or more specific in their en^hasis. Accordingly, this chap­
ter is devoted to a brief analysis of the balance of payments 
of the European Common Market member states and Greece since 
1958.^
What, in general, can we say about the balance of pay­
ments effects, either adverse or favorable, of newly acquired 
membership in a common market? It is reasoned that in the




case of a member state adversely affected by common market 
membership, one kind of evidence might be a persistent defi­
cit in its balance of payments. The process that would bring 
this condition about would be something like the following:
As trade was increasingly liberalized and the member’s indus­
tries subjected to the competition of the generally more effi­
cient industries of its partner(s), the member's economy 
would suffer a decline in employment and economic activity.
In an effort to counteract the decline, it is quite reason­
able to expect that the member's central baink, either on its 
own initiative or at the instance of governmental leaders, 
would adopt an expansionary monetary policy and the central 
government budget itself would show a considerable deficit.
In any case, such policies in the presence of fixed exchange 
rates would cause within a brief time a more than temporary 
external deficit —  longer than temporary because the condi­
tions which originally initiated the process are of a struc­
tural nature and subject to very slow alteration.^ Note, of 
course, the necessity of the assumption that the money supply 
and hence money incomes in the state adversely affected are 
expanded (or at least maintained) as a compensatory measure, 
rather than the reverse assumption of a contraction of the
^The deficit would persist unless the money supply 
was contracted to lower domestic demand for foreign goods.
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money supply by the monetary authorities. (The latter pol­
icy, some might still contend, is the one called for under 
the given conditions and that actually followed, it is said, 
under the gold standard.) A nation, of course, may develop 
an external deficit, and rather quickly, if it is on fixed 
exchange rates, even in the absence of structural difficul­
ties, provided its policy makers have adopted a sufficiently 
expansionary monetary policy.^
We could not, therefore, immediately conclude that a 
large deficit was solely or even primarily due to the adverse 
effects of participating in a plan for regional economic in­
tegration. The most that can be said is that am uncomfort­
ably large deficit, one lasting more than a year, establishes 
the presumption that a regional economic union of recent ori­
gin may have contributed to the decline in the economy of the 
member state experiencing the deficit. By a reverse kind of 
reasoning it could be inferred that a persistent surplus was 
tentative evidence that a member state might be reaping ex­
ceptional rewards from its participation. In neither case, 
however, could it be conclusively said the balance of pay-
D. H. Robertson once wrote in an article entitled, 
"The Economic Outlook", that if absolutely set upon it, any 
country can create an adverse balance of payments for itself 
within half an hour. Economic Journal, December, 1947.
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meats disequilibrium was definitely and exclusively the re­
sult of being a part of a newly formed customs union or com­
mon market. Such a finding would have to be confirmed by 
other evidence.
Overall Balance of Payments 
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the balance 
of payments of the European Common Market member states, 
plus Greece. The figures are in millions of United States 
dollars; the classification is that of the International 
Monetary Fund. For the purpose of determining approximately 
the condition of the overall balance, the two last columns 
are the significant ones. Minus figures in these columns, 
though debit items, signify a surplus condition in the over­
all balance of payments, inasmuch as these entries represent 
accommodating monetary movements, and if negativd, offset 
surplus credits in the other accounts. Positive figures in 
these columns, on the other hand, offset an excess of debits 
in other accounts, and must be considered indicative of a 
deficit condition in the overall balance.
Table 1 discloses that the German overall balance 
has shown a strong surplus in three years, (1958, 1960 and 
1963), moderate surpluses in 1961 and 1964, and moderate 
deficits in 1959 and 1962. For the seven-year period the
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATEMENTS^ 
(In millions of dollars)



















1958 90 284 374 -76 74 -4 30 -39859 -48 136 88 -16 -32 —80 -16 -48 10460 14 146 160 -50 -50 100 -34 28 -15461 -40 134 94 -42 60 -116 14 218 -22862 • • 124 124 —28 4 —48 28 -118 3863 -66 38 -28 -54 24 42 12 204 -20064 -22 32 54 -48 178 24 . 8 40 -256
Franc Area1958 -211 —80 -291 117 215 -96 -16 -129 20059 405 327 732 -20 481 -133 111 386 -1,55760 —20 632 612 -38 304 -173 -4 -14 -68761 371 589 960 43 323 -110 54 122 -1,392347 411 758 37 417 -656 29 102 -687177 245 422 89 444 -429 128 202 -85664 -178 96 —82 62 431 -83 449 38 -815
Germany
1958 1,787 12 1,799 -375 -124 -206 -95 -175 -82459 1,846 -158 1,688 -702 -254 -806 -25 -304 40360 2,043 —226 1,817 -715 394 -482 400 537 -1,95161 2,429 -758 1,671 -983 360 -1,239 108 -66 15062 1,717 -1,126 591 -1,144 364 -265 231 -35 25863 1,469 10 1,459 -1,239 784 -376 -132 172 -67864 1,421 -113 1,308 -1,205 89 -492 470 -183
Italy
1958 -373 946 573 -9 174 -12 37 143 -90659 -133 925 792 -37 262 31 -199 48 -89760 -634 1,006 372 -55 310 41 -232 -268 -16861 -556 1,108 552 -44 500 29 -463 40 -61462 -880 1,211 331 -53 451 -184 -685 430 -29063 —1,808 1,182 -626 -32 9̂34 . -37. -1,511 650 62264 -580 1,265 685 -25 9S5 -875 -443 -337
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TABLE 1— C o n tin u e d
N on-M onetary  
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Mdse
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A cc t
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P r i v t
I n s t n s
C n tra ]
I n s tn s
N e th e r la n d s  
1958 32 399 431 -1 6 198 -1 3 3 22 -1 6 -4 8 6
59 19 469 488 -21 -1 9 -9 8 -6 0 -3 5 4 64
60 -1 1 6 488 372 -2 5 1106 -4 1 27 -7 0 -3 6 9
61 -3 4 7 568 221 -4 1 -8 2 -8 9 33 38 -8 0
62 -2 7 9 467 188 -4 7 -2 9 -7 0 -6 0 -1 19
63 -4 4 3 525 82 37 13 -1 0 3 151 -1 3 -1 6 7
64 -1 9 9 154 -4 5 • • 54 - 9 15 53 -6 8
G re e c e
1958 -2 8 4 189 -9 5 17 52 7 2 4 13
59 -2 4 2 197 -4 5 34 43 22 .. -2 -5 2
60 -3 1 0 224 -8 6 28 40 25 2 -5 -4
61 -3 5 0 262 -8 8 24 58 45 -1 2 -2 -2 5
62 -4 4 7 330 -1 1 7 32 103 10 4 -2 -3 0
63 -4 5 2 374 -7 8 30 105 7 -9 -3 8 -1 7
64 -5 7 3 363 -2 1 0 6 137 68 -1 7 7 10
C om piled  fro m  IMF, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s , X V III ,  
No. 6 , an d  IMF, B a la n c e  o f  P aym ents Y earbooks 15 an d  16 .
^ I n c lu d e s  f r e i g h t  a n d  m e rc h a n d is e  in s u r a n c e  an d  o th e r  s e r v i c e s ,  
in v e s tm e n t  incom e and  p r i v a t e  t r a n s f e r s  e x c e p t  a s  f o l l o w s :  F o r
F ra n c  A rea  and  Germany i n  1963 an d  1964 p r i v a t e  t r a n s f e r s  a r e  i n ­
c lu d e d  w ith  c e n t r a l  governm en t t r a n s f e r s .
^ F .O .B . e x c e p t  C . I . F .  f o r  G erm any i n  1963 a n d  19 6 4 .
^ E n t r i e s  f o r  1963 a n d  1964 a r e  f o r  m e t r o p o l i t a n  F r a n c e .
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German net surplus reported to the Monetary Fund was $2,683 
million. It is interesting to note, however, that over the 
six-year period, 1959-64, the surplus for the French Franc 
Area was $5,087 million. Nor can the German surplus for the 
seven years in itself be considered remarkable compared with 
those of the other nations. They are as follows (figures in 
millions): Belgium-Luxembourg, $740; Italy, $1,990; Neth­
erlands, $1,450; Greece, $143.
The overall balance by itself, however, conceals im­
portant details. It does not show, for example, the primary 
or secondary origins of a surplus or deficit. These can only 
be discovered by examining the main accounts separately.
Germany
Table 2 fills in more of the details of the German 
balance of payments. We see that Germany's overall surplus 
was achieved despite an outflow of funds in the form of gov­
ernment transfer payments in the neighborhood of $6 billion 
and a net capitàl outflow, mainly the result of government 
loans, amounting to $2,244 million.^ That a sizable overall 
surplus could have been recorded while so large an outflow
^he figure given here for government transfers is 
an approximation based on an estimate of $1,100 million each 
for the years 1963 and 1964. The Monetary Fund tables do not 
separate private and government transfers for these years.
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TABLE 2
GEK^ANY: BALANCE OF PAY: .'ENTS 1958-64^
( I n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
T ra d e  b a la n c e ^ 1 ,7 8 7 1 ,8 4 6 2 ,0 4 3 2 ,4 2 9 1 ,7 1 7 1 ,4 6 9 1 ,4 2 1
S e r v ic e s
S e r v ic e s  t o
f o r e i g n  t r o o p s 857 908 976 956 1 ,0 7 5 1 ,0 7 2 1 ,0 5 5
In v e s tm e n t  incom e -1 3 9 -2 3 7 -1 8 9 -328 -328
O th e r -6 3 1 -7 5 8 -9 2 2 -1 ,2 6 7 -1 ,7 3 5 -1 ,0 8 2 - 1 ,1 6 8
N et s e r v i c e s 87 -8 7 -1 3 4 -6 3 9 -988 -1 0 -1 1 3
N et g o o d s  & s e r v i c e s 1 ,8 7 4 1 ,7 5 9 1 ,9 0 9 1 ,7 9 0 729 1 ,4 5 9 1 ,3 0 8
T r a n s f e r  p ay m en ts
P r i v a t e -7 5 -7 1 -9 2 -119 -138
C e n t r a l  governm ent® -3 7 5 -7 0 2 -7 1 5 -9 8 3 -1 ,1 4 4
N et t r a n s f e r  p ay m en ts -4 5 0 -773 -8 0 7 -1 ,1 0 2 -1 ,2 8 2 - 1 ,2 3 9 - 1 ,2 0 5
A utonom ous c a p i t a l  a c c o u n ts
D i r e c t  in v e s tm e n t -9 3 21 1 10 -9 7 1 793 89O th e r  p r i v a t e -3 1 -2 7 5 393 350 461
R epaym ents u n d e r  London
d e b t  a g re e m e n t -1 0 2 -3 1 2 -7 0 -7 9 6 -2 1 1 -4 9 2O th e r  o f f i c i a l -1 0 4 -4 9 4 -4 1 2 -443 — 244 j -3 7 6
N et o f f i c i a l  a n d
p r i v a t e -3 3 0 —1 ,0 6 0 -8 8 -8 7 9 99 417 -4 0 3
M o n e ta ry  g o ld
( I n c r e a s e  - ) -9 8 2 -3 3 4 -6 8 9 -1 6 -1 6 5
^C o m p iled  fro m  IMF, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s . 
X V III , N o. 6 a n d  IMF, B a la n c e  o f  P aym en ts  Y earbooks 15 an d  1 6 .
b
F .O .B . f o r  1 9 5 8 -6 2 ; C . I . F .  f o r  1963 an d  1964 .
^ a d e  up  l a r g e l y  o f  r e p a r a t i o n s  t o  I s r a e l  and  o th e r  in d e m n i­




of funds in the form of transfers and exports of capital was 
underway indicates the basic competitive strength of the 
German economy. This is shown directly in the seven-year 
surplus in the current account of approximately $10 billion.
There were, however two factors which possibly oper­
ated to the advantage of the German economy. One of these 
was largely unrelated to the competitiveness of the economy; 
the other allegedly enhanced its competitiveness. The first 
factor was in the form of large receipts for services to 
foreign troops and military agencies, amounting to approxi­
mately $6.9 billion. The greater part of these earnings 
were paid by the United States Government. How much the 
German overall balance of payments surplus would have been 
without these credits cannot be known. But it seems reason­
able to believe that in their absence, it would have been 
reduced materially.
The other factor which supposedly operated in favor 
of a high volume of German exports was an official price for 
the deutsche mark which in effect, it was said, undervalued 
it.
The mark was revalued upward by 5 per cent, from 
23.8095 cents to 25 cents, on March 5, 1961. The revaluation 
is viewed as a step in recognition of the mark's previous
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alleged undervaluation, a situation conducive to a balance 
of payments surplus.^ The effect of this action is diffi­
cult to assess, although in 1961 Germany continued to run a 
surplus in its external accounts, albeit by a smaller amount, 
and in 1962 there was a deficit. Next year the accounts 
again showed a surplus. Export prices probably tend to ad­
just in a relatively short time to a change in a currency's 
official rate of exchange, so that a revaluation will not 
long handicap an economy which for some underlying reason is 
tending to surpluses. The matter is further obscured when 
we take into account that a rise in prices and incomes in 
other countries will necessarily alter the effects which 
would have followed from revaluation of one country's cur­
rency .
According to one point of view, Germany tended to 
run an embarrassingly large surplus more or less continuously 
prior to the revaluation because the mark was undervalued, 
which had the effect of giving German exports an additional 
competitive advantage. It is possible, however, to reverse
^The revaluation was one of a series of complex mea­
sures adopted by the government amd the central bank to cor­
rect the large balamce of payments surplus of 1960, to dis­
courage speculative capital movements into the country and 
at the same time to encourage a capital outflow. --See Annual 
Report (IMF, 1962), pp. 92-94.
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the above cause and effect relationship as follows; The mark 
was a strong currency and appeared to be undervalued because 
Germany had a fairly consistent balance of payments surplus. 
All things considered, it would seem that a change in its cur­
rency's par value can work to the advantage or disadvantage 
of a trading nation's payments position for only a relative­
ly brief time. Export prices will tend to adjust to the new 
situation. If a surplus again develops for other reasons, 
the currency's official value will again appear to be low.
We thus arrive at the tentative conclusion that the mark’s 
par value prior to 1961 might not have been the major factor 
causing Germany's surpluses, but that the revaluation of 
March 1961 possibly contributed temporarily to the slacken­
ing of these surpluses and to the deficit of 1962.
France
The entries in Table 1 pertaining to France are in 
reality applicable to the entire French Franc Area. The Franc 
Area includes, in addition to metropolitan France, the French 
Overseas Departments and Territories and a number of countries 
which were formerly under French control but have become in­
dependent in recent years. Table 3 shows the net contribution 
of the Overseas Franc Area in each year except 1958. All 
the other entries reflect the transactions of metropolitan
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TABLE 3
FRANCE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1958-64*
(In millions of dollars)
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Trade balance^ -211 435 92 417 501 177 -178
Services
Travel ., 237 216 198 121 23
Government 164 172 92 94 70
Investment income 42 25 50 66 • *
Other 138 82 -17 -36 3
Net services -80 275 581 495 323 245 96
Net goods & services -291 710 673 912 824 422 —82
Transfer payments
Private .. 46 96 115
Government 117 -85 -55 -95
Net transfer payments • • 31 -39 41 20 89 62
Autonomous capital accounts
Direct investment 215 409 J  63 76 200 118 1 431Other private 1  1 7 6 207 86 326 1Government® -96 -274 -354 -440 -722 -429 -83
Net capital 119 129 -115 -57 -434 -15 348
Net transactions of Overseas
Franc Area with Non-
Franc Area 59 -12 89 117 132 245
Monetary gold
(increase -) -540 -352 -480 -466 -588 -555
^Compiled from IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
XVIII, No, 6, and IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbooks 15 and 16.
^F.O.B.
Includes advance debt redemptions of (in millions of 
dollars) 185 in 1960; 320 in 1961; 583 in 1962; and 281 in 1963.
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France with the rest of the world other than the Franc Area. 
The total net contribution of the Overseas Franc Area for 
the years 1959-64 was $630 million. Subtracting this from 
the overall Franc Area surplus of $5,087 million as derived 
from Table 1, this gives an overall surplus for metropolitan 
France of $4,457 million, which is $1,774 million greater 
than the German overall surplus for the same years. This 
large payments suirplus, which was pulled down by advance debt 
redemptions totaling $1,369 million, was made possible by con­
tinuous surpluses in the current account from 1959 until 1964. 
Otherwise, France benefited from net private foreign invest­
ment totaling $2,303 million.
Probably very few, if any, students of the French 
economy would have predicted this favorable payments record. 
Just prior to the time the Treaty of Rome began to be imple­
mented France's ability to live with the Treaty and carry 
out its obligations was still subject to considerable doubt.^ 
The performance of the French economy as reflected in its 
balance of payments history is probably not due primarily, and 
may be only incidental, to membership in the Common Market.
Benoit says the chief worry of many of those follow­
ing the negotiations was whether France might fail to imple­
ment the required tariff cuts as they came due in view of her 
financial weakness and the opposition of her small business 
group. Emile Benoit, o£. cit., p. 67.
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A combination of other favorable circumstances probably had 
greater weight. Not the least of these was that after years 
of political and social turmoil which adversely affected its 
economy, France regained a degree of internal stability soon 
sifter the Common Market was inaugurated. A new government 
ended the costly struggle in Algeria and finally stabilized 
the franc in December 1958.^ The nation seemed to achieve 
a unity of purpose formerly lacking. And as in the case of 
the other European countries, the size of the surpluses can 
be attributed in an indeterminable but large degree to the 
creation of international reserves stemming from the suc­
cessive deficits in the United States balance of payments.
It should be noted that the French current account 
was in deficit in 1964 after five continuous years of sur­
pluses. The overall balance was still aided by a net capital 
inflow of $348 million. The current account weakened under 
the impact of a steep rise in internal costs, especially in 
more recent years. Between 1958 and 1964 export prices rose 
an average of 19 per cent, in part under the influence of
The stabilization of the franc and eventual restor­
ation of convertibility had much to do with the return of 
international and domestic confidence in the currency and 
probably was a factor in helping to coax some foreign private 
balances back to France.
58
iwage increases averaging 49 per cent between 1958 and 1963.
Inflation has not been fully controlled, although "In the
course of 1964 great strides were made towards the recovery
2of economic and financial equilibrium."
Italy
The case of Italy is in part similar and in part 
different from that of France and Germany. Italy, too, has 
had a fairly substantial overall surplus for the seven years. 
But the current account weakened in 1962, as is shown in 
Table 4, and in 1963 carried a $947 million debit balance. 
This was only partially offset by net transfer payments of 
$289 million. The monetary sector capital accounts of Table 
1 indicate that the overall deficit was $1,272 million. This 
appears to be a deficit of much greater them ordinary magni­
tude. The autonomous capital accounts technically carried 
a surplus of $897 million, but recognition must be taken of 
the large item of $1,470 million shown as repatriation of 
Italian banknotes in Table 4, The origin of this entry is 
the remittance abroad by Italian residents of Italian bank-
^International Financial Statistics (IMF), XVIII, 
No. 4, pp. 120-21.
2The Economic Situation in the Community (Europeaui 
Economic Community Commission, December 1964), p. 57.
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TABLE 4
ITALY: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1 9 5 8 -6 4 '
( In  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
T ra d e  b a la n c e ^ -3 7 3 -1 3 3 -6 3 4 -5 5 6 -8 8 0 - 1 ,8 0 8 -5 8 0
S e r v ic e s
T r a v e l 411 448 548 647 723 749 825
In v e s tm e n t  incom e -3 4 -5 -3 0 -5 2 -9 1 -1 1 4 * ,
G overnm ent 95 105 79 59 32 39 * #
O th e r 198 155 153 138 203 187 140
N e t s e r v i c e s 670 703 750 792 867 861 965
N et goods & s e r v i c e s 297 570 116 236 -1 3 -9 4 7 385
T r a n s f e r  p ay m en ts
P r i v a t e 276 222 256 316 344 321 300
C e n t r a l  g o v ern m en t - 9 -3 7 -5 5 -4 4 -5 3 -3 2 -2 5
N et t r a n s f e r  p a y m e n ts  267 
A utonom ous c a p i t a l  a c c o u n ts
185 201 272 291 289 275
D i r e c t  in v e s tm e n t 109 174 290 97 119 170 , ,
O th e r  p r i v a t e 65 88 20 403 333 . 764
G overnm ent -1 2 31 41 29 -184® -3 7 , ,
N et c a p i t a l 162 293 351 529 268 897 995
M o n e ta ry  g o ld
( i n c r e a s e  - ) -6 2 0 -6 6 3 -4 5 5 -2 2 -1 8 -1 0 0 236
N et e r r o r s  & o m isso n s 37 -1 9 9 -2 3 2 -4 6 3 -6 8 5 -1 ,5 1 1 -8 7 5
R e p a t r i a t i o n  o f
I t a l i a n  b a n k n o te s . . -6 3 -1 8 5 -3 3 0 -7 6 6 - 1 ,4 7 0 ..
O th e r  e r r o r s  an d
O m iss io n s -1 3 6 -4 7 -1 3 3 81 -4 1
C o m p iled  fro m  IMF, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s , 
X V II I ,  No. 6 ,  a n d  IMF, B a la n c e  o f  P aym en ts  Y earb o o k s 15 an d  1 6 ,
^ I n c lu d e s  e m ig r a n t s '  r e m i t t a n c e s  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )  
o f  188 f o r  1958 ; 170 f o r  1959 ; 214 f o r  1960 ; 261 f o r  1961 ; 298 ; f o r  
1 9 6 2 ; an d  283 f o r  1 9 6 3 . ; |
I  '^ I n c lu d e s  ad v an c e  d e b t  re p a y m e n t o f  $179 m i l l i o n .  ,;
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notes which are subsequently returned to Italy for redemp- 
1tion. Actually this represents an export of capital, and 
when so considered, puts the capital account in deficit in 
both 1962 and 1963.
The immediate cause of the deficits was a sharp in­
crease in imports relative to exports between 1961 and 1963.
The index of import volume rose from 182 to 259 (1958 = 100)
2while that for exports increased from 176 to 207. The in­
crease in the export price index from 92 to 95 between 1961 
and 1963, while the import price index rose only from 90 to
391, accounts for the rise in isqjorts relative to exports. 
Internal inflation was back of this development. It is re­
flected in an increase in bank credit of 20.8 per cent between 
1961 and 1962 and of 20.6 per cent between 1962 and 1963 and 
in an increase in the index of wages from 109 to 130 between 
1961 and 1963.^
We must inquire into whether the inflationary upsurge, 
which evidently started sometime in 1962, was a reaction to
Ânnual Report (IMF, 1963), p. 137.





an unfavorable impact on the Italian economy from intensified 
competition within the European Economic Community. The evi­
dence of this might be a decline in, or marked slackening in 
the rate of increase of, both industrial production and manu­
facturing employment beginning in 1961 and continuing through 
1962 and 1963. Index figures for both these are given in 
Table 5, A slight slackening in their rates of increases 
is, in fact, indicated, but the likelihood is that it was 
caused by the approach to capacity levels of operation in 
many sectors of the economy and by pressure on available pro­
ductive resources.
TABLE 5
INDICES OF ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
AND MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT*
(1958 = 100)
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Industrial
production 100 111 128 142 156 169
Manufacturing
employment 100 100 107 114 120 124
^International Financial Statistics (IMF), XVIII,
No. 6, pp. 168-69.
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The directors of the International Monetary Fund reported 
in 1963 that unemployment, formerly a factor in maintaining 
relative stability in Italian wages and prices, had steadily 
fallen because of the rapid economic expansion in Italy and 
the large-scale employment of Italian workers in other Euro­
pean countries.^ Thus the high rate of activity and rela­
tively full utilization of capacity, in the presence of 
continued rising demand, had much to do with the deteriora­
tion in the Italian balance of payments in 1962 and especially 
in 1963.
It is clear that 1964 was a year of adjustment for 
Italy in which both the government and central bank were 
obliged to carry out measures to correct some of the condi­
tions which helped create the massive deficit of 1963. These 
included a tightening of credit, fiscal measures involving 
special taxes to reduce consumption, especially of luxury 
items, stabilization of government expenditures and measures
pto encourage exports.
Evidently these measures accomplished what they were 
designed to do. According to Table 1, Italy recorded an
^Annual Report (IMF, 1963), p. 135.
2Annual Report (IMF. 1964), pp. 89-90,
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overall surplus in its international payments for 1964 along 
with a respectable current account surplus due to an accel­
erated rise in exports while the trend in imports was weak.^
Belgium-Luxembourg, Netherlands
As noted earlier, both Belgium-Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands have recorded overall international payments 
surpluses for the years 1958 to 1964. Belgium-Luxembourg's 
surplus amounted to $743 million; the Netherlands' was 
$1,450 million. Table 6 gives the details of Belgium-Lux­
embourg* s balance of payments. The current account has 
shown considerable variation, recording a $78 million debit 
balance in 1963 but showing considerable improvement in 1964. 
The autonomous capital accounts showed increasing surpluses 
in both 1963 and 1964.
The Netherlands' payments position was especially 
strong in the first three years of the Common Market, as can 
be seen both in Table 1 and Table 7. So large had been the 
payments surpluses from 1958 to 1960, mainly due to heavy 
credit balances in the current account but also due to an 
exceptional inflow of short-term speculative capital in 1960, 
that the guilder was appreciated early in 1961, almost con-
^he Economic Situation in the Community (European 
Economic Commission, December, 1964), p. 72.
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TABLE 6
BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1 9 5 8 -6 4 ^
( I n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
T ra d e  b a la n c e ^ 90 -4 8 14 -4 0 -6 6 22
S e r v ic e s
F r e i g h t ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
a n d  m dse. i n s .  56 50 24 -8 10 10
In v e s tm e n t  incom e 50 22 46 36 14 -1 2 -1 0
O th e r 154 6 18 46 48 -1 0 , .
N et s e r v i c e s 260 78 88 74 72 -1 2 -2 8
N et goods & s e r v i c e s 354 30 102 34 72 -7 8 -6
T r a n s f e r  p ay m en ts
P r i v a t e 20 58 58 60 52 50 60
C e n t r a l  g o v ern m en t , • -1 6 -5 0 -4 2 -2 8 -5 4 —48
N et t r a n s f e r  p ay m en ts 20 42 8 18 24 -4 12
A utonom ous c a p i t a l  a c c o u n ts
D i r e c t  in v e s tm e n t  and
o t h e r  p r i v a t e -7 6 -3 2 -5 0 60 4 24 178
G overnm ent 74 -8 0 100 -1 1 6 —48 42 24
N e t c a p i t a l — 2 -1 1 2 50 -5 4 -4 4 66 202
M o n e ta ry  g o ld
( i n c r e a s e -3 5 4 136 -3 6 -7 8 -1 1 6 -6 -2 5 6
^C o m p iled  fro m  IMF, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F in a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s , 
X V II I ,  No. 6 ,  an d  IMF, B a la n c e  o f  P aym ents Y earb o o k s 15 an d  1 6 .
^ E x p o r ts  f . o . b . ,  im p o r ts  f . o . b .  f o r  1 9 5 8 -6 0  an d  1964 and  
p a r t l y  f . o . b . , p a r t l y  c . i . f .  f o r  1 9 6 1 -6 3 .
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TABLE 7
NETHERLANDS: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1 9 5 8 - 6 4 '
( I n  m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )
1958 1959 1 9 6 0 1961 1962 1 9 6 3 1964
T r a d e  b a l a n c e ^ 32 19 - 1 1 6 -3 4 7 -2 7 9 -4 4 3 -1 9 9
S e r v i c e s  
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  a n d
m d se . i n s . 134 176 229 26 2 276 275 89
I n v e s tm e n t  in c o m e 8 6 150 106 166 105 178 56
O th e r 162 138 124 118 74 69 6
N e t s e r v i c e s 3 8 2 4 6 4 4 5 9 546 4 5 5 5 22 151
N e t g o o d s  & s e r v i c e s 4 1 4 4 8 3 343 199 176 79 -4 8
T r a n s f e r  p a y m e n ts
P r i v a t e 17 5 29 22 12 3 2
C e n t r a l  g o v e rn m e n t - 1 6 - 2 1 - 2 5 - 4 1 -4 7 37 . .
N e t t r a n s f e r  p a y m e n ts  1 
A u to n o m o u s c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t s
- 1 6 4 -1 9 -3 5 4 0 2
D i r e c t  in v e s t m e n t -2 1 5 - 2 0 5 -6 8 - 6 9 -5 2 - 6 5  j 54O th e r  p r i v a t e 4 1 3 186 174 - 1 3 23 78  i
G o v e rn m e n t -1 3 3 —98 -4 1 - 8 9 - 7 0 - 1 0 3 - 9
N e t c a p i t a l 65 - 1 1 7 65 -1 7 1 -9 9 - 9 0 4 5
M o n e ta ry  g o l d
( i n c r e a s e  - ) -3 1 3 -8 1 - 3 2 0 -1 3 1 • • - 2 0 - 2 4
C o m p ile d  f ro m  IM F, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s , 
X V I I I ,  N o. 6 ,  a n d  IM F, B a la n c e  o f  P a y m e n ts  Y e a rb o o k s  15 a n d  1 6 .
^ F . o . b .
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currently with the revaluation of the German deutsche mark, 
to dampen down inflationary pressures.^ The revaluation 
had the expected effect of reducing the payments surplus 
in 1961, and a small deficit ensued in 1962. Table 7 indi­
cates that the current account surplus dwindled from $199 
million in 1961 to $79 million in 1963.
Rather than revalue the guilder, the Dutch authori­
ties might have chosen to leave its par value unaltered.
If, then, as the likely result, total exports, including in­
visibles had continued to be excessive in relation to all 
imports, causing a continuing rise in foreign exchange and 
bank reserves, action might have been taken to sterilize 
part of the increase to combat its inflationary effect. In 
this case, the rise in national output and income might have 
been little different from what it actually was, but the 
economy's export industries would have maintained a compe­
titive advantage somewhat longer. In taking the action they 
did the Dutch probably reduced to some degree the competi­
tiveness of their exports, at least in the short run.
Greece
The association of Greece with the European Economic
^See Annual Report (IMF, 1962), p. 94.
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Community dates only from November 1962. Assessment of the 
effect of the association on Greece is possibly premature 
because of the brief period of association. Nevertheless, 
we note in Table 1 that as far as the balance of payments 
is concerned, Greece* overall surplus increased slightly in 
1962, rose considerably in 1963, but deteriorated in 1964.
The Greek overall surplus over the entire period shown is 
due to a continuous inflow of capital and grants and dona­
tions large enough to more than offset an uninterrupted de­
bit balance in the current account.
As time progresses, the association of Greece with 
the Common Market should provide a test which may throw some 
light on the question of whether a nation which is both small 
and relatively underdeveloped can gain or even survive in an 
economic union in which its partners are either larger or 
more fully developed, or both, "The Association Agreement 
. . . lays down that the Greek economy may one day be fully 
integrated with that of the Common Market. This meams a fun­
damental change in the economic and social life of the coun­
try and holds out much promise for the future; it also re­
quires energetic action to develop the Greek economy during 
the transitional p e r i o d . I t  is recognized that Greek
Êuropean Investment Bank 1958-1963 (Brussels: Euro­
pean Economic Community, 1964), p. 44.
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development plans will necessitate large injections of for­
eign capital. Accordingly, EEC aid in the form of a loan 
of $125 million spread over five years is provided for in 
the Association Agreement.
International Liquidity 
Balance of payments developments are ultimately re­
flected in changes in the foreign exchange reserves of na­
tions. As we would expect in view of the aggregate surpluses 
which all Common Market members have recorded, their reserves 
have increased. The total increase for all six members was 
approximately $9.8 billion. Percentagewise, however, there 
is considerable variation in the increases of each member, 
as Table 8 shows. France recorded by far the largest in­
crease in absolute terms and by 1964 possessed reserves se­
cond only to Germany’s in volume. This is perhaps not inapp­
ropriate since France's economy is the second largest in the 
Common Market.
It would be an oversimplification to attribute 
France’s large increase in reserves to any special benefits 
derived from membership in the Common Market or to a rapid 
revitalization of her export industries. The increase grew 
out of a combination of favorable events, some of which have 
already been suggested. Among these was a change in monetary
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TABLE 8
OFFICIAL GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES^ ^
Country
Reserves Reserves Increase 
at end at end 1958-64 








as % of 
GNP
Belgium-
Luxembourg 1,553 2,192 639 4.4 15.2
France 1,050 5,724 4,674 5.8 7.2
Germany 5,879 7,882 2,003 2.1 8.4
Italy 2,127 3,823 1,696 3.8 8.6
Netherlands 1,539 2,349 810 5.6 16.2
Greece 170 281 111 2.5 6.4
^IMF, International Financial Statistics, XVIII,
No. 4
^Includes IMF reserve position.
and fiscal policies which had as their objective the slow­
ing down of the excessive inflation of the early and middle 
fifties. The inflation of those years had given France a 
chronic balance of payments problem and shrunk its foreign 
exchange reserves to abnormally low levels. After the last 
devaluation of the franc December 27, 1958, imports fell 
considerably, and gold dishoarding by French residents helped
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further to reduce the deficit,^ Inflation has continued in 
France but not at such a rate as to cause French export 
prices to be greatly out of line with the prices of other 
countries' exports. In addition, with a return of inter­
nal stability and the lure of its membership in the Common 
Market, France began to attract an increased amount of 
American private capital.
To give the increase in each country's reserves ad­
ditional perspective. Table 8 also shows both the seven- 
year increase of each country and its total reserves at the 
end of 1964 as percentages of its GNP for the latest avail­
able year. The German ratio of increase in reserves to its 
GNP is actually the smallest of all. Not too much signifi­
cance, however, can be attached to this. German reserves 
in 1958 were probably abnormally high in relation to the 
reserves of its partners, especially France. They were only 
$390 million less than the total reserves of all the other 
members. A perpetuation of this imbalance was hardly to be 
expected if the Common Market plan was to function at all 
satisfactorily.
Summary
All EEC nations ran balance of payments surpluses
^Annual Report (IMF, 1959), pp. 88-92.
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aind gained foreign exchange reserves during the 1958-64 
period. Germany began with a heavy superiority in terms 
of volume of reserves. We saw that at the end of the per­
iod she still had larger reserves than any of the others, 
but her partners were relatively in a better position from 
the standpoint of reserves than they were when the Common 
Market was inaugurated.
All members had generally satisfactory balance of 
payments records for the period as a whole. The Italian 
external balance deteriorated rather rapidly in 1962 and 
1963, but there was reason to believe that it was not caus­
ed so much by problems created by its membership in the 
Common Market as by other factors. Principal among these 
were the excessive strength of internal demand caused by 
inflationary pressures while the continued expansion of sup­
ply became increasingly limited by an approach to capacity 
utilization of productive resources. This applied particu­
larly to the gradual exhaustion of large reserves of labor 
which Italy still had in the early years of the Common Mar­
ket's operation.
Without the increase in international liquidity 
which has taken place in the recent past, the surpluses of 
the Common Market countries during this time would most likely
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have been smaller, and one or more countries might have had 
overall deficits instead of surpluses. The growth in liqui­
dity, therefore, may conceal certain weaknesses in the com­
petitive position of one or more EEC nation. Data on economic 
growth and trade are examined in the next chapter for possible 
insights into this.
CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TRADE
In this chapter let us first look briefly at what 
economic theory has to say concerning the possible effects 
of customs unions on their members. This will enable us 
better to interpret the data presented later on.
The theory of customs unions is a highly conq>lex 
one as is known by those who have read any of the growing 
number of contributions which have been made to it in recent 
years.^ Much thought has been devoted to consideration of 
the effects of a union on productive efficiency and hence on 
economic welfare within the union as a whole. These consid­
erations arise because both trade creation and trade diversion 
take place when a customs union is formed. Trade creation 
stems from the greater number of profitable opportunities for
^he complexity originates in the fact that the es­
tablishment of a customs union involves elements both of 
free trade and protection: free trade within the union, but
the maintenance of, and possibly an increase in, protection 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
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trade between the partners when customs and other barriers 
are removed. Diversion results because trade in some pro­
ducts between partners and third countries will be reduced 
whenever the new common tariff exceeds the tariff formerly 
imposed by the partners individually on these products. Di­
version tends to reallocate resources and production to 
higher-cost producers within the integrated area. However, 
since trade creation has the opposite effect, i.e., reallo­
cates resources and production to lower-cost producers with­
in the area, productive efficiency will be enhanced if the 
amount of trade creation exceeds the amount of trade diver­
sion. Whether this happens will depend in an important de­
gree on the height of the common tariff which is eventually 
placed on the meiny products for which an import potential 
exists in the integrated area. The lower these tariffs are 
set, the less will be the scope of trade diversion for a 
given amount of trade creation.
Professor Viner’s pioneer work on customs unions 
advanced what was at that time the novel view that a customs 
union would have more advantages for a group of countries 
whose economies were competitive rather than complementary. 
Competitiveness was described as "correspondence in kind of 
products of the range of high-cost industries as between the
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different parts of the customs union which were protected 
by tariffs in both of the member countries before customs 
union was established."^ According to Balassa, "Competi­
tiveness denotes a large degree of overlapping in the range 
of the commodities produced, and complementarity means sub- 
stantial differences in the scope of production.* He says 
that, " . . .  efficiency is likely to be improved in a customs 
union of competitive economies, although the beneficial ef­
fects will be impaired if the member countries have strong 
competitors abroad. Finally, if the participating economies 
were largely complementary, discrimination against third-
2country producers would lead to negative production effects."
Other beneficial effects of a customs union to its 
members as a group may derive from (1) the stimulation of 
more widespread and effective competition through the elimi­
nation of monopolistic distortions within the individual
^Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Car­
negie Endowment for International Peace, 1950), p. 51. Prior 
to this the commonly held view, both among free traders and 
protectionists, was that a union of complementary economies 
would offer the greatest natural advantages. See Bela Balassa, 
The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, 111.: Richard
D, Irwin, Inc., 1961), p. 30,
^Balassa, op. cit., p. 32. Negative production ef­
fects "refer to the extra cost of producing a commodity in 
the partner country rather than in the foreign country as 
trade diversion shifts the source of supply from lower cost 
(foreign) to higher-cost (partner) producers,", p. 27.
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economies; (2) an induced increase in the average rate of 
growth through the stimulation of greater investment which 
has become profitable in the larger market created; and 
(3) the possibility of exploiting economies of scale in a 
larger market.'
These last factors fall into the dynamic category 
and, like the other factors heretofore mentioned, are con­
cerned with the overall effects of economic integration on 
the region as a whole. A second question (or set of ques­
tions) of possibly more recent origin concerns the effect 
of a customs union or common market on its members indivi­
dually or on the separate regions which make up the union.
Will economic integration always benefit a country, or might 
its effect under certain conditions be damaging to it? Also, 
is it possible, while benefits may be secured by all members 
of a customs union or common market, that these benefits may
Isee Harry G. Johnson, "The Economic Theory of Customs 
Union," Pakistan Economic Journal, X, No. 1, 14-32, reprinted 
in Harry G. Johnson, Money, Trade and Economic Growth (Cam­
bridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 46-74; also Balassa,
op. cit., ch. 6 and 8. In a recent book, Jaroslav Vanek has 
pointed out with some logic that if a customs union can bring 
about these desired effects within the customs area, it is 
possible that it may have the opposite effects in the rest of 
the world. That is, if large enough, it may narrow the world 
market for some products, lower the average rate of growth 
elsewhere by reducing the profitability of investment, etc.
See General Equilibrium of International Discrimination (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 9.
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be shared very unequally, a disproportionately large part 
of them going to one or two members in a union of, say, 
five or more members? It is with these questions that we 
are concerned in this study, with specific reference to the 
European Common Market.
Criteria for Customs Unions
Two criteria have been given to evaluate customs 
unions for their potential capacity to benefit their members 
by making possible a balanced growth of trade between them. 
It is. said that a given customs union or common market has 
a greater chance of success the nearer alike the partners 
are in (1) size and in (2) stage of development.^ If one or 
two countries are so far superior in one or both these res­
pects as to be clearly dominant, they may prosper at the ex­
pense of their partners. The strains which would result 
would then imperil the success of the union and might cause 
its dismemberment. We can now evaluate the European Common 
Market not only according to these criteria but also accord­
ing to Viner's criterion of competitiveness.
First, using the latter, there seems little doubt
^Charles Staley, "Central American Economic Integra­
tion," Southern Economic Journal, XXXIX, No. 2, 88-95; also 
J. E, Meade, The Theory of Customs Unions (Amsterdeun: North
Holland Publishing Co., 1956).
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that the Common Market countries represent a competitive 
grouping.^ One indicator of this is the percentages of 
the civilian labor forces employed in agriculture, industry 
and services in the six countries. These are shown in 
Table 9.
TABLE 9




Agriculture Industry Services Unemployec
Belgiuiu 1963 6 45 47 2
France 1963 19 39 40 2
Germany 1963 12 49 38 1
Italy 1963 26 40 31 3
Luxembourg 1960 15 44 41 • •
Netherlands 1961 10 42 47 1
^Statistical Office of the European Communities, 
Basic Statistics of the Community (5th ed., Brussels, 1964), 
pp. 24-25.
Next we compare the economies of the Common Market 
by their size amd level of development. To coop are size, 
we use each country's gross domestic product. Level of
Balassa says "Even a cursory glance at the indus­
trial and foreign-trade statistics of the European Common 
Market countries would reveal a considerable degree of riv­
alry in the economic structure of these economies. In addi­
tion, a significant part of this union's imports consists 
of raw materials which cannot be produced inside the Common 
Market." --The Theory of Economic Integration, p. 33,
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development is reflected in per capita domestic product; 
the higher the level of development, the larger the coun­
try’s per capita product. These comparisons are given in 
Table 10.
TABLE 10













^United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts,
1963, p. 329.
Using figures for 1958 (the year the Common Market 
was organized) the table shows there was considerable vari­
ation in size among the six members of the union and Greece, 
At the extremes, Germany’s economy is about six times larger 
than the economy of Belgium and Luxembourg taken together. 
The Netherlands’ economy is hardly any larger than Belgium- 
Luxssnbourg ’ s, while France’s economy is not much smaller 
than Germany’s. The Italian economy is about midway in size
80
between the largest and the smallest. There is less varia­
tion in terms of per capita domestic product. Aside from 
Greece, Italy is the only country which is markedly differ­
ent from the rest. By size, then, the Common Market coun­
tries could not be considered a balanced group, but in terms 
of economic development they show much more balance. If 
small countries are actually at a disadvantage when grouped 
with much larger countries in a customs union, we would ex­
pect the smaller economies of Belgium, Luxembourg amd the 
Netherlands to encounter difficulties as members of the Com­
mon Market. Italy, having the less developed economy of the 
Six, would find itself at a disadvantage if the level of de­
velopment has amy relevance as a criterion in this context, 
as would Greece if it eventually becomes a full-fledged 
member.
Comparative Rates of Growth 
Consideration can now be given to rates of economic 
growth of the Common Maurket members to see how well they have 
performed in this respect since the Common Market was inaug­
urated. Table 11, which gives average annual growth rates 
of gross national product, shows these rates of increase, 
not only in the aggregate for each country, but also on a 
per capita basis. The per capita rates reflect the ability
81
TABLE 11
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT AT CONSTANT PRICES*
(In percentages )
Aggregate gross Per capita
national product gross national product
1953-58 1958-63 1953-58 1958-63
Belgium 2.5 3.9 1.9 3.3
France 4.6 5.2 3.7 3.8
Germany 6.9 5.7 5.7 4.4
Italy 5.2 6.7 4.6 6.1
Luxembourg 3.0 • # 2.4
Netherlands 4.1 4.8 2.8 3.4
Community 5.4 5.5 4.4 4.4
Greece 6.2 6.2^ 5.2 5.3^
^Statistical Office of the European Communities, 
Basic Statistics of the Community (5th ed., Brussels, 1964), 
p. 35.
b.1958-62.
of the country to raise average living standards among its 
residents. The table also contains entries for the Community 
average and for Greece. The effect of inflation has been 
removed; the figures reflect real growth rates.
In this comparison the small countries, except Greece, 
recorded somewhat lower growth rates than the Community aver­
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age. But of equal, if not greater, significance was the 
fact that both Belgium and Netherlands raised their aver­
age rates of growth during the Common Market years from 
1958 to 1963 from relatively low levels in the preceding 
six-year period, Italy, which had the highest growth rate 
of all, raised its average by a full one and one-half per­
centage points over the preceding six years. The French 
rate was practically stationary, and Germany's rate of 
growth declined between the two six-year periods.
Imports and Exports 
A common market necessarily affects the trade flows 
of its members. New competitive forces begin to take shape 
as a common market is increasingly implemented. To find 
out how the trade of individual members of the European Com­
mon Market has been affected in the initial years of the 
organization's existence, we can compare the index figures 
for imports and exports of these years. Table 12 shows the 
increases in intracommunity imports and exports for the mem­
ber nations and Greece. Italy recorded a considerably higher 
rate of increased participation in intracommunity trade than 
the other members. Until 1963 Italy's trade with her part­
ners was in reasonable balance most of the time, but in that 
year imports from her partners increased much faster than
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TABLE 12
INDICES OF INTRACOMMUNITY EXPORTS AND IMPORTS*
(1958 = 100)
Exports
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Be 1 gium-Luxeinbour g 100 111 139 152 179 214
France 100 134 180 213 239 272
Germany 100 113 140 167 188 227
Italy 100 132 177 215 ' 267 295
Netherlands 100 119 138 153 169 198
Community 100 119 149 173 198 232
Greece lOO 83 68 69 91 97
Imports
Be 1 gium-Luxeinb ou r g 100 111 130 146 160 183
France 100 111 151 171 206 255
Germany lOO 130 159 181 211 229
Italy 100 131 191 224 275 360
Netherlands 100 115 137 166 177 203
Community 100 119 149 173 198 231
Greece 100 89 98 113 126 133
^Statistical Office of the European Communities, 
Basic Statistics of the Communities (5th ed.; Brussels, 
1964), pp. 108-9, 112-13.
exports to them. Here again is evidence of the effect of 
cost inflation in Italy on the Italian balance vis-a-vis 
the rest of the Community. A continuation of this trend 
could have somewhat serious implications for the Community's
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internal balance. Although the table does not give data 
for 1964, there is reason to believe that the imbalance be­
tween Italy's intracommunity imports and exports was re­
dressed in 1964, or at least partially so. This is probably 
true because the Italian balance of payments was in surplus 
in 1964, as we saw in Chapter IV.
Among the other members. Table 12 shows that through 
1963 Belgium-Luxembourg and France experienced more rapid 
growth of intracommunity exports than imports, while the re­
verse was true of the Netherlands, although in the latter*s
case the difference was not great. For Germany the growth 
in both exports and imports was almost the same. From the 
data given here for Greece we would have to conclude that 
Greece is not selling as much to the Common Market as it
should in view of the rise of its imports from the Community.
Terms of Trade 
The changing impact of a country's international 
transactions on its trading position may also be reflected 
in its terms of trade. There are limitations on the conclu­
sions which may be drawn from comparisons of terms of trade 
if these comparisons are made between two points widely sep­
arated in time. This is because the terms of trade cannot 
take account of changes in product quality or in the products
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themselves. Nevertheless, comparisons over relatively short 
periods may provide helpful insights because neither the 
products that are traded nor their quality will change great­
ly in the short term. If the time span is brief enough, 
therefore, the terms of trade can be used along with balance 
of payments to interpret changes which may have occurred in 
a nation's trade picture; that is, to decide whether such 
changes in a nation's overall trade position are to be con­
strued as favorable or not, and in either case, whether they 
may be only partially so.
As an example, suppose that a country has had a sur­
plus in its current account for several years running and 
that as a likely coincident condition it has had full enç>loy- 
ment. Assume further that the current account surplus has 
caused an overall balance of payments surplus of equal size. 
As a result the country would accumulate exchange reserves 
in the amount of the cumulation of surpluses. In itself, 
this may appear to be an unqualified favorable development, 
but if there has been a simultaneous deterioration in the
In other words, the impact of autonomous trans­
actions in the other accounts is assumed to be neutral, so 
that attention may be concentrated on the current account 
where the effect of changing terms of trade would be 
felt.
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nation's commodity terms of trade,^ the development is only 
partially favorable. For in that case its accumulation of 
reserves is being made possible by a rising proportional in­
put of its own resources; i.e., it is exporting more for 
each unit of imports than before.
Another type of situation may arise in which there 
is a deficit in a nation's balance of payments at the same 
time that its terms of trade have appeared to be improving.
In this instance, the improvement in terms of trade is not 
favorable although it may appear to be. A reasonable infer­
ence would be that internal inflation had pushed the nation's 
export prices upward too rapidly, causing an "improvement" 
in the terms of trade but also bringing on a deficit in the 
balance of payments.
But even this type of situation would be preferable 
to the one in which there was a coincidence of a balance of 
payments deficit and deteriorating terms of trade. In the 
latter situation both developments could be due to fundamen­
tal structural problems which might prove to be very intrac­
table in resolving, whereas in the former case, if both the 
payments deficit and "improving" commodity terms of trade
^Index of export prices divided by the index of im­
port prices.
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were due to internal inflation and there was no other ele­
ment in the picture, the cause of the difficulty presumably 
would be more easily remedied.
We have said that the commodity terms of trade for 
a country are found by dividing the index of its export pri­
ces by the index of its import prices.^ It is ordinarily 
possible with available statistics to compute another type; 
namely, the income terms of trade. This is found by multi­
plying a nation's volume index of exports by its export 
price (or average value) index and dividing by its import
price (or average value) index. In symbols we would write
Pethe commodity terms of trade the income terms of
trade Presently we will show both of these for the
Common Market countries for different years.
A third type of terms of trade, sometimes called the 
factoral terms of trade, has been discussed in the litera­
ture, but little has yet been done with it empirically be­
cause to do so requires the availability of an index of pro­
ductivity for the country whose terms of trade are being 
calculated. Conceptual amd statistical difficulties, however, 
have thus far made it very difficult to compute relatively
^This is also sometimes referred to as the net bar­
ter terms of trade.
88
reliable productivity indices for a country to be used for 
this purpose.^ Productivity indices are not available for 
all members of the Common Market. Consequently, the fact- 
oral terms of trade will not be considered.
In determining and comparing the commodity and in­
come terms of trade, our interest is centered on whether 
there was a deterioration in either of these for any of the 
members as the Common Market was increasingly implemented.
We also want to determine whether one or more countries ex­
perienced a distinct improvement in terms of trade, a rate 
of improvement not experienced by the rest.
Table 13 shows that from 1957 to 1963 both Germany 
and Italy experienced marked improvement in the commodity 
terms of trade, Germany's rising with little interruption 
from 100 to 120 and Italy's more irregularly from 90 to 102 
(1953 = 100). Both France and the Netherlands also enjoyed 
some improvementp and only Belgium's commodity terms of trade 
deteriorated slightly. Greece' commodity terms of trade 
first rose, then fell, and between 1962 and 1963 underwent 
a sharp increase from 115 to 131.
See Gottfried Haberler, A Survey of International 
Trade Theory (Princeton, N. J.: International Finance
Section, Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 25.
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TABLE 13
COMMODITY TERMS OF TRADE' 
(1953 = 100)
Average Value Terms of Trade
Exports Imports
Belgium
1957 106 102 104
1958 99 95 104
1959 95 93 102
1960 97 93 104
1961 96 95 101
1962 95 93 102
1963 95 93 102
France
1957 106 111 95
1958 116 117 99
1959 126 128 98
1960 132 133 99
1961 131 130 101
1962 132 129 102
1963 133 131 102
Germany
1957 103 103 100
1958 103 94 110
1959 102 91 112
1960 104 93 112
1961 104 89 117
1962 105 87 120
1963 104 87 120
Italy
1957 95 106 90
1958 91 93 97
1959 83 87 96
1960 87 85 102
1961 84 83 101
1962 83 83 100
1963 86 85 102
90
TABLE 13— Continued





























































Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop­
ment, General Statistics, September, 1964.
Let us next consider the income terms of trade. It 
was suggested by the Economic Commission for Latip America 
in their Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949, that this 
measure be regarded as an index of the "capacity to import" 
because it shows the quantity of in^orts bought by exports. 
The import price index in this measure serves as a deflator 
of the value of exports obtained by multiplying the export
91
quantity index by the export price or average value index.
Table 14 shows that Italy's capacity to import more 
than doubled from 1957 to 1963, while Germany's increased 
a little less dramatically during the same period. The per­
centage growth in the capacity to import for each country 
was as follows; Italy, 148; Germany, 94; France, 83; Neth­
erlands, 74; Belgium, 62; and Greece, 54.
TABLE 14









1957 104 133 138
1958 104 136 141
1959 102 154 157
1960 104 168 175
1961 101 177 179
1962 102 197 201
1963 102 219 223
France
1957 95 131 124
1958 99 137 136
1959 98 164 161
1960 99 192 190
1961 101 202 204
1962 102 205 209
1963 102 223 227
Germany
1957 100 188 188
1958 110 194 213
1959 112 217 243
1960 112 249 279
1961 117 264 309
1962 120 273 328










1957 90 178 160
1958 97 189 183
1959 96 232 223
1960 102 280 286
1961 101 336 339
1962 100 377 377
1963 102 389 397
Netherlands
1957 98 135 132
1958 100 147 147
1959 103 165 170
1960 102 188 192
1961 102 193 197
1962 102 207 211
1963 102 225 230
Greece
1957 110 139 153
1958 118 150 177
1959 108 145 157
1960 109 147 160
1961 111 161 179
1962 115 175 201
1963 131 179 235
^Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop­
ment, General Statistics, September, 1964,
There is a more than casual correspondence 
between these percentages of growth in the capacity to import 
of the several countries and the increases in per capita 
gross national product indicated in Table 11. That is, the
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order in which the Common Market members stood in regard to 
their growth in capacity to import was exactly the same as 
their ranking with respect to individual increases in aver­
age annual per capita real gross national product from 1957 
to 1963. Only Greece’ showing with respect to growth in 
capacity to import differed markedly from her performance 
in increasing per capita gross national product from 1957 
to 1963. But Greece did not become associated until 1962.
The success of the two economies which led in in­
creasing national output (Italy and Germany) was very pro­
bably related to their ability to participate to a greater 
degree in the growth of international trade as evidenced by 
the more rapid rise in the export quantity index for both 
these nations. This, in turn, made possible the more rapid 
increase in the capacity to import.
Italy's income terms of trade or capacity to import 
improved more than Germamy’s, due entirely to a greater in­
crease in the quantity export index.
The diverse trends here evident with respect to 
the terms of trade very possibly had nothing to do with 
any influence of the Common Market. If they are assum­
ed to have been caused by effects of the changes introduced 
by the Common Market, this could be interpreted to mean that
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smaller economies can expect a worsening of their terms of 
trade as partners of larger economies. However, it should 
be remembered that as a member of a common market, a smaller 
economy cannot be damaged by an act of one of its partners 
in arbitrarily raising barriers against its exports. Also, 
trade blocs are supposed to have more bargaining power than 
their member economies individually. Therefore, a smaller 
economy would have some protection for its terms of trade as 
a member of a common market.
Terms of trade, we know, are not wholly unaffected 
by the relative inflationary and anti-inflationary policies 
of the respective governments. A government which opts for 
a relatively more inflationary policy can bring about an 
improvement in the country's commodity terms of trade but 
may thereby cause a smaller relative improvement in the in­
come terms of trade and throw its balance of payments into 
deficit. Thus, the Italian commodity terms of trade impro­
ved from 100 to 102 between 1962 and 1963, and the Italian 
income terms of trade improved from 377 to 397. But the 
latter was a relatively smaller improvement than Belgium's 
improvement in its income terms of trade from 201 to 223 
which took place though its commodity terms of trade remain­
ed unchanged at 102, At the same time, the Italian current
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account fell deeply into deficit, while Belgium's current 
account was not far out of balance in 1963.
Summary
In this chapter we have seen that the Italian eco­
nomy by several measures showed the most vigorous response 
to the stimulus provided by the Common Market. Its in­
creases in aggregate GNP and average annual per capita GNP 
and its improvement in income terms of trade exceeded those 
for other member countries. This result conflicts with one 
of the points discussed earlier in the chapter which im­
plied that countries with less advanced economies might find 
it difficult to adjust to the more and more unrestricted 
competition of a customs union or common market, the others 
members of which were more developed.
Overall, the smaller economies showed a somewhat 
lower level of performance than their larger partners in 
the Common Market from 1958 to 1963. Belgium had the small­
est recorded increase in aggregate and per capita GNP, while 
its commodity terms of trade worsened slightly and its in­
come terms of trade improved less than its partners'. The 
Dutch economy did only slightly better in these respects.
On the other hand, Belgium, which had the lowest percentage 
increase in per capita GNP between 1953 and 1958, improved
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its growth rate between 1958 and 1963 over the rate between 
1953 and 1958 more than any other member except Italy. And 
in this respect, the Netherlands showed more gain than did 
France and Germany. Germany's growth rate from 1958 to 
1963, though relatively high, was lower than its growth 
rate from 1953 to 1958, but this is not to suggest that the 
drop was due to effects of the Common Market on Germany.
While apparently gaining less from the Common Market 
in some respects than France, Germany and Italy, the smaller 
members were able to realize sufficient benefits to increase 
economic welfare among their residents. Furthermore, their 
rates of growth in per capita real GNP were significantly 
higher during these years than those of three important in­
dustrially advanced economies not in the EEC, namely, the 
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.^
Finally, by most criteria Germany benefited very 
much from the Common Market, albeit less than Italy.
In the next chapter we shift our attention to factor 
movements smd search for any effects of the Common Market 
on them.




Our purpose in studying movements of labor and capi­
tal between the members of the Common Market is to ascertain 
whether there has been a tendency for one or more members 
to gain either of these resources to the increasing detri­
ment of one or more other members, A common market involves 
a customs union as its basic feature but goes beyond a sim­
ple customs union in providing for unrestricted movement of 
labor and capital between the separate political units mak­
ing up the common market. Theoretically, as an area which 
formerly was partitioned for trade purposes is opened for 
freer movement of mobile resources, a certain amount of move­
ment in these resources will take place in response to dif­
ferential rates of return in the different parts of the area. 
Ideally, some capital would migrate from regions where it 
was in relatively abundant supply to regions where it was re­
latively scarce, and similarly for labor. Less capitalized 
regions thus would be benefited while regions with surplus
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labor would be helped in the solution of their unemployment 
problems. In some situations, however, this desirable de­
velopment predicted by traditional abstract theory may not 
happen as indicated. Some analysts of common market pro­
blems believe that a type of perverse development may occur 
in which both capital and labor would move in the same dir­
ection. Some regions may gain capital and labor at the ex­
pense of other regions, or alternatively, some regions may 
lose skilled and energetic elements of their labor force 
without being compensated by any significant inflow of capi­
tal. At the same time, the more favored regions may gain 
these desirable labor resources but export little or no capi­
tal to less favored regions. Location theory is used to 
analyze some of the possibilities.
Regional Agglomeration
When Western European economic integration was still 
in the discussion stage, one group of theorists foresaw its 
realization as causing a shift in the location of industry 
such that there would be increasing concentration in favored 
areas. Employing the terminology of location theory, there 
would be a tendency toward regional and away from national
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agglomeration.^ These theorists expected that Western Euro­
pean integration would strengthen the attractiveness of the 
highly industrialized center, for both labor and capital. 
Towns and regions with artificial advantages due strictly 
to national agglomeration when production and trade was more 
nationally oriented would lose some of their advantages.
Both capital and labor might gravitate away from poorer re­
gions and countries to richer. "It could happen, for in­
stance, that in the absence of a sufficient number of 'ubi­
quitous' branches, a country poorly endowed with natural 
resources may find that union means, for it, the massive 
emigration of its labor force and capital. Contrary to the 
conclusions based on the assumptions of classical theory, 
it would then be the 'rich' country which would be the bene­
ficiary of union. The 'poor' country would be reduced to
production of small capital intensity, for instance to agri- 
2culture." Or in the words of Professor Brown, an associa-
An agglomeration may be defined as an increasing 
geographical concentration of economic activity in response 
to a production or marketing advantage resulting from the 
carrying on of production to a considerable extent in one 
place. See Balassa, op. cit., p. 194,
^Maurice Bye, "Customs Unions and National Interests", 
International Economic Papers, No. 3 (1953), p. 226, See 
also Herbert Giersch, "Economic Union between Nations and the 
Location of Industries", Review of Economic Studies, No. 2 
(1949-50), pp. 91-92.
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tion in which formerly protected poorer regions enter a 
union with developed richer regions poses the possibility 
that the poorer regions will be "sucked dry."^
These views on the effect of regional economic inte­
gration on less developed economies can be compared with 
those of Gunnar Myrdal regarding the damaging effect of freer
trade on underdeveloped countries, Myrdal believes that free
2trade results in an increase in international inequalities. 
Freer trade between developed and underdeveloped countries, 
according to Myrdal, tends to freeze specialization in es­
tablished patterns, so that the underdeveloped economies re­
main largely producers of primary products for which world 
demand is both unstable and inelastic. Moreover, he says, 
terms of trade have tended to worsen for the poorer nations 
further hindering their efforts to increase national income.
In general, he calls for larger doses of aid, internationally 
administered, from the rich nations, and for unilateral re­
moval of their trade barriers against the poorer nations' 
exports. His view of the Common Market in 1960 seemed to be
Â, J. Brown, "Common Market Criteria and Experience," 
Three Banks Review, No, 57, (1963), p. 6,
2See Rich Lands and Poor, (New York: Harper and Bros.,
1957), ch. 5; also. Beyond the Welfare State (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1960), pp. 241-244.
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that it had the earmarks of a club organized for the selfish 
advancement of its members' interests at the expense of cur­
tailing their economic relations with nations outside it.^
The location of greatest industrial concentration in 
Western Europe is the Ruhr in Germany and the adjacent re­
gions of neighboring countries. It was believed by those 
writers who maintain that regional economic integration tends 
to accentuate regional disparities that the region around the 
Ruhr would gain the most from the Common Market. Its gains,
it was thought, would be at the expense of the south and
2west of France and most of Italy. The principal benefici­
aries of the plan, in addition to Germany, would be the 
Benelux countries.
In placing emphasis on the increase in regional dis­
parities growing out of economic integration, the represen-
Beyond the Welfare State, pp. 147-48. Myrdal might 
have been premature in his criticism. Hallstein recently 
noted that "our imports from all developing countries have 
been roughly ten times as high as those of the Soviet Union, 
twice as high as those of the United Kingdom and far above 
those of the United States. Effective financial aid by the 
Six in 1962 amounted to 2,800 million dollars as against an 
estimated 390 million dollars from the entire Eastern bloc. 
Nor did the greater part of this aid go to Africa, although 
economic, geographical and historical links give Europe an 
outstanding role in the development of this continent . . ." 
Community Topics 17 (European Community Information Service, 
1965), p. 13.
2See Balassa, op. cit., p. 203.
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tatives of this school of thought overlooked or discounted 
opposite developmental tendencies which may accompany the 
institutional changes. Location theory demonstrates that 
in situations where agglomerative factors have been at work, 
a point can be reached where deglomerative factors, which 
have their origin in uneconomic increases in both land rents 
and labor costs, can begin to appear.^ In addition, when 
national barriers to trade are removed, regions near fron­
tiers formerly at a disadvantage because of unnatural bar­
riers to commodity and factor movements may now develop under 
/
the influence of liberalized commerce. These newly favored 
regions presumably may be a part of smaller and less deve­
loped as well as of larger developed countries. A third 
possibility would be that "spread effects" from highly de­
veloped regions would reach out to benefit backward regions 
of a union. These effects may occur in the form of rising 
demand for the less developed regions' products, an increase 
of mobile external economies and resettlement of plants to 
take advantage of wage differences. A survey of these possi­
bilities indicates that conflicting economic forces affecting
^Ibid., p. 194. 
^Ibid., p. 204.
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the location of industry may well begin to exert themselves 
after a common market begins to operate.
Capital Movements 
What has actually happened in the Common Market 
during its initial years with respect to movements of capi­
tal and labor among the Six? Insofar as capital is concern­
ed, Table 15 shows us there has been no massive movement into 
or out of any of the member countries. Within the Community, 
the Benelux countries, especially Holland, have been net ex­
porters of direct investment and private long-term capital. 
The other members appear to have been importers of long­
term capital within the EEC, but not in amounts which can 
be considered large for a four or five-year period. It is 
possibly of some significance that Germany, which within 
the context of the Community was already well endowed with 
capital, was a net importer of private capital, apparently 
for the most part from the Benelux countries. All members 
except Belgium-Luxembourg experienced inflows of private 
capital from the United States and Canada, the Netherlands' 
inflow of $514 million being the largest.
Capital amounting t6 $172 million was invested in 
Italy, the least advanced economy in the Community, from 
other Common Market members between 1959 and 1963. Of this
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TABLE 15
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AMONG EEC COUNTRIES 
AND THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
(In millions of dollars)
With U.S. With EEC
& Canada Countries
Belgium-Luxembourg^
Direct investment and other




Direct investment 150 94




Direct investment and other
private long-term 251 59
Government 51
f 110Italy
Direct investment and other




Direct investment and other
private long-term 514 -479
Government -8.-487^
Compiled from IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbooks 12,
13, 14, 15 and 16.
^For years 1960-63; 'For years 1960-62.
Includes some investment in associated enterprises. 
®For years 1959-62. ^For years 1959-63. Private 
and government investment under EEC Countries column includes 
investment vis-a-vis all non-sterling GEEC countries in 1960.
^For years 1959-63. 
and EEC institutions.
‘including the European Fund
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amount approximately $100 million was direct investment and 
other private long term, while $71 million was government 
capital. These sums do not reflect further investment which 
is destined for Italy as a result of its membership in the 
Common Market. The European Investment Bank, an official 
Community institution, has committed the greater part of its 
loan capital to Italy. Of $358.3 million in loans approved 
up to the end of 1963, $236.1 million, or 66 per cent, was 
earmarked for Italy.^ Much of this money going to Italy is 
being concentrated in the south, a region known as the MezzO- 
giorno, which for decades has been economically stagnant.
The loans from the European Investment Bank have been supple­
mented by loans from other foreign sources. As a result of 
this investment and other special efforts by the Italian
government, "unemployment now affects only 3 per cent of the
2active population in the south of Italy." Chronic under-
^European Investment Bank, Annual Report (1963), p. 59.
2Ibid., p. 47, The Annual Report further states that 
"During the period 1950-62, total investment in the Mezzogior- 
no increased at the average rate of 11 per cent per year at 
constant prices, a rate higher than that for Italy as a whole 
(9 per cent) and that of the Community (8 per cent). This in­
crease concerns both agriculture and industry, investment by 
individuals and that of private and public enterprises, as 
well as the action of the State through the public authorities 
and the Casa per il Mezzogiorno." --pp. 47-48,
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employment in agriculture has dropped, and there has been a 
steady flow of labor out of poor agricultural employment in­
to industries, both in the region and elsewhere.
Labor Migrations 
The situation with respect to labor movements is 
less complicated. The dominant development has been the 
moderately large migration of Italian labor to other members 
of the Community, principally France and Germany. Table 16 
shows the net migration of labor between Italy and the other 
members of the Community for each of several years.
TABLE 16
NET MIGRATION OF ITALIAN WORKERS, 1958-63^
(In thousands)
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Belgium 2.1 —3.6 -4.3 -2.9 1.0
France 29.6 15.4 24.2 20.3 26.0 12.9b
Germany 12.6 21.7 86.0 56.6 70.1 20.9
Luxembourg 2.1 1.2 1.5 2.1 2.2 .0
Netherlands -1.1 —0.6 0.9 2.6 0.5 -0.4
Total 45.3 34.1 108.3 108.7 99.8 34.2
Compiled from Statistical Office of the European 
Communities, Statistics of Employment in the Countries of 
the Community and Greece, No. 4, 1963, and Statistics of Em­
ployment in the Countries of the Community, Supplement 1964,
^To June 30,
Positive entries signify increases in the number of 
Italian workers in each country. The table indicates that
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the flow of Italian workers into the other member countries 
began to taper off in 1962. Table 17 gives the net movement 
of workers into aoid out of each country vis-a-vis the rest 
of the EEC and the world. Positive entries signify a net 
immigration. Table 18 gives unei£ç>loyment percentages for 
EEC members from 1958 to 1963.
TABLE 17
NET MIGRATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES OF 








^Compiled from Statistical Office of the European 
Communities, Statistics of Employment in the Countries of 
the Community and Greece, No. 4, 1963.
An Evaluation 
Is it possible to evaluate the effect of the opera­
tion of the Common Market on its members as far as it may 
be revealed in these statistics on capital and labor move­
ments? The four basic tables to which we have referred are 
certainly not sufficient for a detailed and exhaustive ap­
praisal of these movements. They present the data only in
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TABLE 18 










Belgium 5.2 6.0 5.2 4.2 2.2 2.4
France 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4
Germany 2.7 1.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.6
Italy 6.4 5.4 4.0 3.4 2.9 2.5
Netherlands 2.3 1.8 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.9
^Compiled from Manpower Statistics 1950-1962. Organ­
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, and 
General Statistics, OECD, (September 1964).
broad aggregates. A lengthy, detailed study is beyond the 
scope of this paper and moreover is probably not necessary 
for our purposes. The aggregates appear to present enough 
information to substantiate several conclusions,
1. The outstanding feature to be noted is the ab­
sorption of the large number of Italian and other foreign 
workers by the German economy. Despite this absorption, the 
economy at times has experienced labor shortages when many 
requirements have not been filled. Without so large an as­
sist from supplies of foreign labor the economy’s growth 
rate would have been slowed. While the other members, es­
pecially France and excepting Italy, also had a net inflow
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of labor, Germany’s was by far the largest. The impression 
is made that Germany’s economy possesses considerable dyna­
mism and definite expansive characteristics.
2, The exodus of workers from Italy is about what 
we would expect to happen when the reserves of a labor sur­
plus region are free to migrate in response to labor market 
inducements. For the present it has been advantageous both 
to Italy and the other members which have imported Italian 
labor. Italy has been relieved of dealing with what might 
have been a serious unemployment problem. In addition, some 
of the earnings of Italian nationals have been remitted to 
Italy and have been the source of substantial credits in the 
Italian balance of payments.
Migration of surplus labor can be an advantage to 
the exporting country so long as the labor resources involv­
ed are not the "cream" of the labor force and so long as it 
does not hamper the internal development of that country’s 
economy. As we saw in Chapter IV, a point was finally reach­
ed when Italian labor reserves approached depletion with 
consequent excessive pressure on wage rates and export prices 
and a deterioration in the Italian external balance.
3, It is doubtful that in the first five or six 
years of the Common Market’s operation that any member's
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economy wô.3 damaged by excessive losses of capital to its 
partners. There was an outflow of private capital of mod­
erate proportions from the Benelux countries to other mem­
bers, but the labor unemployment rate fell to low levels in 
these countries as it did in the rest of the Community, and 
output expanded at rates, which though lower than the average 
for the Community, would not be considered unsatisfactory.
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AHD CONCLUSIONS
The European Common Market in 1958 has come to be 
referred to as "the Common Market" in much contemporary dis­
cussion. The general public probably thinks of it as the 
only such institution which has ever been in existence. But 
it is only one of a number of comparable organizations which 
have existed before and exist today.
Common markets are regional organizations designed 
to surmount obstacles to international trade when freer trade 
is impossible to achieve on a multilateral basis. The German 
Zollverein is an earlier example of a common market, one of 
the few attempts at economic integration which bore fruit 
long enough to set the stage for the founding of a new na­
tion, Valid comparisons can be made between the Zollverein 
and the European Common Market. It is possible, but as yet 
by no means certain, that the Common Market will result in 
the formation of some type of new European political feder-
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ation, in effect converting six sovereign states into a 
single nation.
There are, however, certain dissimilarities between 
the Zollverein of nineteenth-century Germany and the Euro­
pean Common Market. These dissimilarities were pointed out 
in Chapter II where the history of the Zollverein was re­
counted. The differences are believed by the writer to be 
significant enough to throw into doubt the view that Prus­
sia's role in the Zollverein is at all comparable to West 
Germany's position in the Common Market.
In Chapter III the events and negotiations leading 
up to the Treaty of Rome were reviewed. In the writer's 
opinion they provided a sound basis for concluding that the 
Common Market was formed as a result of a broad consensus 
among Europeans and their leaders that such an organization 
would serve a vital purpose. No compelling reason could be 
found for believing that German political or business lead­
ers had an exceptional role in influencing the outcome.
Balance of payments histories were the subject of 
Chapter IV. An analysis was made of these histories to de­
termine whether any member(s) had had extended and trouble­
some deficits which might indicate difficulties created by 
competitive pressures from a potentially dominant member of
113
the union such as Germeoiy. Since every member had had agg­
regate surpluses for the years 1958 to 1964, it was conclud­
ed that on this score evidence was lacking that any of the 
national economies had been damaged by the intensification 
of competition from a dominant partner. The large Italian 
deficit of 1963 was explained by internal inflation in com­
bination with other factors quite indirectly related to com­
petition within the Common Market.
In Chapter V data were introduced to show the cheinges 
and trends in the national economies of the Common Market in 
respect to their national products and foreign trade. Again 
we were looking for imbalances and other signs of instability 
caused by possible domination of the union by one member.
Here we found some variation in growth rates. The smaller 
economies had demonstrably lower rates than their larger 
partners. But any interpretation which might have been plac­
ed on this, linking it to the Common Market, was obscured by 
the fact that the smaller economies and also Italy had im­
proved their per capita growth rates in the years that they 
had been members of the Common Market, whereas Germany and 
France had not. Italy, the least developed country of the 
Six, had the highest growth rate in the Community. The Ger­
man growth rate was second highest to that of Italy. Germany
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and Italy also scored high in the improvement of their terms 
of trade.
Factor movements were the subject of Chapter VI. 
These are considered important for the analysis of Common 
Market problems because as the Common Market has been im­
plemented, more liberty has been granted to labor and owners 
of capital for the transfer of these resources across nat­
ional boundaries in the Community in response to market in­
ducements. We know from history and experience that labor 
surpluses tend to migrate when given the opportunity. This 
has happened in the Community where several hundred thousand 
Italians have found employment in the economies of the other 
member countries. Germany, over a period of time, has ab­
sorbed the largest number of Italian workers in addition to 
many thousand workers from southern Europe, making the total 
influx of foreign workers in Germany well over a million and 
a half. Other than the migration of Italian workers, labor 
movements among members of the Community have not been large 
enough to be significant in the context of this study.
Whereas Italy has exported large supplies of labor 
to other members of the Common Market, it has imported a 
moderate amount of investment capital from them. Belgium 
and the Netherlands appear to have been the only net expor­
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ters of capital within the Community through 1963.
Conclusion
We set out to ascertain whether Germany had as yet 
begun to dominate the Common Market to the extent of hurt­
ing the economies of any of the other members of the Com­
munity by its alleged economic advantages and corqpetitive 
strength. No convincing evidence was found to support 
the hypothesis in this form.
The economy of every member state has operated at 
high levels of activity, there have been surpluses in the 
balances of payments and fairly steady advances in output 
and volume of trade. Other reasons advanced for this con­
clusion are (1) Italy, the least developed among Common 
Market members, attained a rate of growth, both in output 
and trade within the Community, greater than Germany's;
(2) intracommunity exports of no member diminished during 
the six-year period but, on the contrary, expanded at a 
rate which for some countries exceeded the German rate of 
increase.
The conclusion here reached should not be interpre­
ted as categorically indicating that the German economy en­
joyed no greater benefits by Common Market membership than 
any of the other participants. Germany has maintained an
116
economic growth rate which has been higher than that of any 
other member except Italy. It has had less inflation than 
France or Italy. Its commodity terms of trade showed the 
greatest improvement. Can we then conclude all this was due 
to Common Market membership? This is a possible, even a 
plausible, explanation. But we cannot be sure that similar 
or perhaps larger gains might not have been achieved by Ger­
many had there been no European Common Market. The German 
economy may indeed be more dynamic than the other national 
economies which make up the Community, but it has not been 
shown up to now that the others have been damaged by their 
being in the same trade bloc with it.
It must be admitted that the conditions under which 
the Common Market has developed have been highly favorable. 
For the most part, the years since its founding have included 
a more or less continuous economic expansion unmarred by a 
serious recession in Europe. In the future, if a recession 
does develop, some of the fears of those who have regarded 
the Community as fundamentally unbalanced and dominated by 
Germany may prove correct. In that case, unemployment and 
underutilization of resources may rise more steeply in some 
regions outside Germany than within. But there is no over­
whelming reason to think that this tendency should become
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aggravated in the absence of discriminatory measures and 
subsidization of exports, both of which, of course, will be 
prohibited under the Common Market. Even a mild tendency 
for this to happen, i.e., for other regions in the Community 
than Germany to experience higher recessionary unemployment, 
is by no means foreordained. But conceding for the sake of 
argument that this may happen, the increase in trade bar­
riers which depressions sometimes have led nations to insti­
tute are hardly a desirable alternative. It seems reasonable 
to believe that general recovery from depression would be 
easier and more quickly attained if trade remained relatively 
free within a customs area than would be true if it were in­
creasingly restricted through national efforts to export 
unemployment.
Finally, the implications of our findings in the 
case of the Common Market look favorable for common marrkets 
in general. They indicate that possible difficulties creat­
ed by differences in size and level of development between 
members of a common market are not necessarily insurmount­
able or prohibitive of the success of the union. Every pro­
jected common market, of course, has its own unique condi­
tions, and initial disparities in regional incomes greater 
than those found in the European Common Market may bar the 
success of other common markets where this condition exists.
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